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This dissertation consists of two chapters that cover Education, Labor and Health Economics.
Chapter 1. Impacts of Compulsory Schooling Reform on Higher Education and
Intergenerational Educational Mobility we estimate the effects of an exogenous in-
crease in mandatory schooling (5 years to 8 years of schooling), as a result of a change in
compulsory schooling law, on higher education, potential intergenerational educational mo-
bility, and labor market outcomes among women in Turkey. Our empirical strategy addresses
a well-known identification problem where women’s years of schooling are endogenous to in-
dividual characteristics. The Law took effect in 1997, whereby girls born before January 01,
1987, were allowed to drop out after primary school, while girls born after that date were
required to stay in school for at least three more years. This created a natural experiment
that we empirically capture by a Regression Discontinuity Design. We use data from the
latest round of the Turkish Demographic Health Survey conducted in 2013, allowing us to
compare cohorts of college-age women. We find that the benefits of compulsory schooling
laws may be magnified as women covered by the law attended not only junior high school but
also high school and beyond at a higher rate. We also find evidence of upward intergenera-
tional education mobility, as those women also achieved higher levels of education compared
to their mothers. However, we find little evidence that additional years of schooling affects
v
labor force participation in significant ways, though it increases the likelihood of getting a
paid job or one with benefits.
Chapter 2. The Effects of Compulsory Schooling Law on Reproductive Health
Behavior in Turkey I exploit a change in compulsory schooling to estimate reproductive
health behavior by using the Turkish Demographic and Health Survey 2013. The repro-
ductive health behavior comprises of pregnancy behaviors, namely the number of antenatal
visits, birth weight, an examination from a professional/a non-professional, and preferences
for reproductivity namely contraceptive usage, number of desired children, preference of chil-
dren gender (boy vs. girl). The law came into the force in 1997 resulted in individual born
before January 01, 1987, were allowed to drop out after primary school (5 years of school-
ing), while individual born after January 01, 1987, were required to get junior high school
at least (8 years of education). Thus, this natural experiment allows me to find out the
effect of meaningful casual estimates of schooling by implementing Regression Discontinuity
(RD) design. The results indicate that an increase in mother’s education improves their
sensitivity to pregnancy behavior, as measured by antenatal visits, an examination from a
professional. Moreover, an increase in years of mother’s education changes her preferences
for reproductivity, as shown by contraceptive usage, number of desired children. On the
other hand, the results of the law indicate that there is not any significant effect on birth
weight or preference for having boys/girls.
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Chapter 1
Impacts of Compulsory Schooling




Impacts of education, often measured in years of schooling, on economic outcomes can be
complicated and multi-dimensional, as the value of additional years of schooling can go
beyond labor force participation and earnings. For example, what are additional years of
education worth to women in traditional societies characterized by low educational enroll-
ment? Do they vary between rural and urban areas, or between families with high versus
low educational background? While compulsory schooling laws have attracted economists’
attention to various human capital consequences, the impacts are heterogeneous depending
on institutional, contextual, and demographic factors. One meaningful way forward is to
1
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look beyond the traditional labor market outcomes and examine the potential impacts in
specific contexts. For example, the benefits of mandating a few more years of middle school
may have positive effects on high school completion and/or college enrollment. Changes in
compulsory schooling laws create natural experiments, where typically one cohort of individ-
uals is exposed to the education policy change somewhat randomly, say, depending on the
date of birth, compared to other cohorts.
A characteristic feature of these compulsory schooling laws is that they are imposed at
the primary and secondary levels. As a result, individuals exposed to the law typically have
an additional year of schooling. Abstracting from enforcement issues such as absenteeism
and school and teacher qualities, one can estimate the effect of these exogenous changes in
additional year(s) of schooling on a variety of economic variables of interest varying from
lifetime earnings to health behaviors to criminal activities. Examples include such as impacts
of additional years of schooling on wage earnings (Angrist and Keueger (1991)), on health and
fertility behavior including teenage pregnancy (Black et al. (2008)), and criminal activities
(Cook and Kang (2016)). Most of these studies have been conducted in the context of
developed countries, in particular, the United States and the United Kingdom, and evidence
from developing countries are more sparse. Research has also been sparse on the effects
of an initial boost in education on higher education, such as enrolling in and obtaining a
college degree. Relatedly, such laws also offer opportunities to examine the effects of an
exogenous increase in schooling on intergenerational educational mobility. These questions
are particularly important in more impoverished societies and rural areas where the baseline
level of higher education may be low at the time of passing the law.
In this paper, we estimate the effects of an exogenous increase in mandatory schooling as
a result of a change in compulsory schooling law on women’s higher education and potential
intergenerational educational mobility in Turkey. The country presents an ideal setting for
addressing such research questions for several reasons. Despite making progress in terms
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of educational enrollment, it still lags behind other OECD countries. The disparity is even
more pronounced in gender terms. Gender disadvantage in education for females in Turkey is
well documented across several measures. A major initiative to address such disparities was
to pass the Compulsory Schooling Laws in 1997. The law required girls born after January
1987 to complete junior high (secondary) school. Especially if a student graduated from a
primary school in 1997, she could decide to drop out. However, if the student were in her
fourth year of primary education, they would have to continue schooling for four more years.
Practically, the law meant that individuals born before 1987 could drop out after five years
of schooling while individuals born after that date could not.
While the paper builds upon several previous studies that have examined various impli-
cations of the compulsory schooling law, though our particular focus on higher education
and intergenerational mobility has been untested. Dinçer et al. (2014) look into the effect of
schooling on health behavior; Gulesci and Meyersson (2015) focus on the effect of additional
schooling on women empowerment; Güneş (2015) analyzes the effect of the law on child
health outcomes; Erten and Keskin (2019) try to identify which sections of the population
tried to comply with the law and registered the most changes, and Erten and Keskin (2020)
estimate the impact of education on the intergenerational transmission of violence. The
paper also contributes to a small but growing literature on intergenerational educational
mobility. For example, Bauer and Riphahn (2009) use Swiss data to examine the impact of
age, which first enters the primary school on intergenerational mobility and find that age
at school entry significantly affects mobility and reduces the relative advantage of children
of better-educated parents. Black and Devereux (2010) contains a survey of research until
the last decade. In more recent works, Emran and Shilpi (2015) report results from India
and Torul and Oztunali (2017) report on the experimental evolution of intergenerational
educational mobility in Europe.
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Against the backdrop of this literature, we try to make several new contributions. Given
the importance of compulsory schooling law changes and a dearth of research on the second-
order effect on higher education and educational mobility, we ask three related questions
in this paper. First, we investigate whether an increase in mandatory schooling years cre-
ated an effective pathway to higher education. Did the Turkish women covered by the law
also had a higher propensity to finish college (and higher) degrees, or did they increase in
schooling remain limited to the immediate purview of the law? Second, we test whether the
cohorts of women covered by the law achieved higher levels of education compared to their
parents. While recent research and policy discussions have focused heavily on intergenera-
tional income mobility, research on educational mobility is sparser. This is surprising because
educational differences play a crucial role in explaining observed differences in income and
wealth both across individuals and over generations. Furthermore, a critical increase in the
overall education level in all countries has not come with lower inequality (Chusseau et al.
(2013)). Intergenerational educational mobility refers to the relationship between the school-
ing outcome of parents and those of their children. Potential (upward) mobility reflects the
extent to which individuals move up the educational ladder compared with their parents.
Empirically, the effects of schooling are always challenging to identify because inherited abili-
ties or disposition of individuals can confound the effects of additional schooling. The change
in compulsory schooling law provides an opportunity to see these impacts because starting
from one cohort, women obtained three additional years of public schooling. For women
immediately preceding this cohort, all else remained the same except for this schooling law
change. This setting is ideal for a Regression Discontinuity Design in which candidates are
selected for treatment based on whether their value for a critical variable crosses a designated
threshold or cut-point. In this case, if a student graduated from a primary school in 1997,
she could decide to drop out. However, if the student were in her fourth year of primary
education, they would have had to continue primary education for four more years. The
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Law suggested that individuals born before 1987 could drop out after five years of education
while individuals born after that could not. Finally, we examine labor market outcomes
both in terms of participation rate and quality of jobs. For example, we test whether women
who came under the purview of the law had a higher likelihood of getting a job with social
security or having a paid instead of non-paid jobs. Most studies look for what the effect of
the law is on women’s contribution to production. However, the quality of jobs has received
much less attention. Finally, the paper uses data from the latest available round (2013) of
the Turkish Demographic Health Survey (TDHS (2013)). Since all of the previous papers
cited above use the previous 2008 round data, the methodology did allow us to test some of
the hypotheses under consideration here as the time-frame did not allow the affected cohort
to grow old enough to complete university.
We first find that the treatment group of women had significantly more years of education.
However, the effects of the extension of compulsory schooling go beyond that. We also
find that the law increases the likelihood of attending high school or even college for these
women, even though the law did not mandate any schooling beyond eight years. We also
find that women achieved higher levels of schooling compared to their mothers demonstrating
significant upward education mobility. In other words, it was not the case that women who
achieved higher degrees were daughters of highly educated mothers. This is a particularly
important finding in Turkey, as previous research argued that mother’s education could be
interpreted as a proxy for the severity of constraints that women face in schooling in Turkey
(Gulesci and Meyersson (2015)). We do find some upwards educational mobility with respect
to fathers also, though such effects are less significant. Finally, even though we find little
evidence that additional years of schooling affects labor force participation in significant
ways, the women belonging to the treatment group had a higher propensity to have a better
quality job that pays benefits.
On the policy front, our results provide evidence that additional schooling, even at the
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junior high school, may have far-reaching human capital consequences. These may be espe-
cially important for women, poorer and rural and other disadvantaged groups. The positive
impact may also translate into intergenerational educational mobility, as many women may
obtain college and higher degrees for the first time in their families. Given the strong pre-
dictive role education plays in earnings, such mobility may also translate into socioeconomic
mobility and help break the intergenerational persistence of the social gap.
1.2 The History of Compulsory Schooling Law (CSL)
Change in Turkey
1.2.1 Education in Turkey prior to 1997
Before 1997, the main education system in Turkey had three components: 5 years of primary
school (compulsory), 3 years of secondary/junior high school (optional), and 3 years of high
school (optional). Only primary school was compulsory; the rest is voluntary. For middle and
high school, individuals could choose vocational schools, secular schools, or religious schools.
The latter category referred to as Imam-Hatip schools (in recognition of their original goal to
train clerics (imam) and orators (hatip)), saw the biggest fall in enrollment after the reform
(Rutz (1999)). In 1996, Turkey entered the European Union as a customs union and started
preparing for full membership for the future. The Turkish government determined that it
should try and attain educational parity with other EU countries to better negotiate for the
full membership. Motivated by this outside pressure and in view of lowering economic and
social disparities, the government launched the Rapid Coverage of Compulsory Education
Program in 1997. The program increased years of compulsory schooling from five to eight.
As mentioned above, before the program, the compulsory schooling level in Turkey was the
primary level (5 years of education). Some school-age children in both rural and urban
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Impact of CSL
Born Before January 01, 1987 Born after January 01, 1987
5 years of primary school (compulsory) 5 years of primary school (compulsory)
3 years of jr. high school (optional) 3 years of jr. high school (compulsory)
3 years of high school (optional) 3 years of high school (optional)
areas dropped out of school beyond this level. Girls, in particular, dropped out of school at
a higher rate creating an educational gender gap at an early stage. Consequently, overall
enrollments for girls fell short of boys at all levels of education. The disparity was more
severe in more rural and economically backward areas. Accordingly, the policy thrust was
both on increasing overall levels of education and on reducing geographic and gender-specific
educational disparities. To meet the expected increase in enrollment, almost 104,000 new
primary classrooms were built, and over 70,000 new primary school teachers have been
recruited since 1997. According to one case study on the rapid coverage for compulsory
education programs in Turkey, numbers of teachers increased sharply from 1997 to 2003 in
both urban and rural areas in Turkey (Dulger (2004)).
1.2.2 The 1997 Education Law
In 1997, the Turkish parliament of Turkey passed Law No. 4306, known as the Basic Edu-
cation Program, which made eight years of schooling mandatory combining primary school
and middle school. This change became effective in the 1997-98 school year, meaning that if
a student graduated from a primary school in 1997, she could decide to drop out. However,
if the student were in her fourth year of primary education, they would have had to continue
primary education for four more years. The law suggested that individuals born before 1987
could drop out after five, while individuals born after that could not. To summarize, after
the reform, the 3 years of junior high (secondary) school became compulsory. The change is
illustrated below.
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The motivation behind the legal change was mostly political, as discussed extensively
elsewhere (Gulesci and Meyersson (2015)). The National Education Ministry announced the
law in July. The officially stated motivation was to conform to the education requirements
laid down by the European Trade Union, to which Turkey had become a recent member.
However, since the school year started in less than two months from the announcement; the
actual implementation was chaotic (Rutz (1999)). Accordingly, there was some vagueness
with respect to the effective coverage by birthday as pointed out by previous literature
(Dinçer et al. (2014)). On the one hand, Turkish educational law requires that a child starts
primary school in September of the year when he/she turns 6 years old. Students born in
1986 would start schooling in September 1992 and should have completed fifth grade by
August 1997. However, students born in 1987 would start primary school in 1993 and would
be starting fifth grade in 1997. These students would come under the purview of the Basic
Education Program. However, Gulesci and Meyersson (2015) argue that the effective cut-off
date should be school year and not the calendar year. More details are offered in section 3.
1.2.3 Overall Impact
Figure 1.1 shows the trend in the educational gender gap in Turkey in terms of percentages of
women with 8 years of schooling with respect to men using data from the Turkish Statistical
Institute (Tuik). In 1997, when the CSL came into effect, there was a (negative) 14.4% gap.
From this point onward, however, the gap decreased sharply. Not only did the gap gets
eliminated at the end of 2011, but it was also reversed after this period. Figure 1.2 also
shows the education gender gap but at the high school level (11 years of education). Unlike
junior high school, there is no clear linear trend in enrollment in this case. Even after the
educational reform, more boys were enrolled in high school than girls, and the gender gap
went up and down till the 2002-03 school year. However, though the gap continued to close
beginning 2007-08, it was not eliminated even after more than a decade of passing the law.
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1.3 Data
The empirical analysis relies on the 2013 Turkey Demographic and Health Survey (TDHS
(2013)), which was conducted between September 2013 and January 2014. Interviews were
completed among 11,794 households, with 9,746 women age between 15 and 49. This nation-
ally representative sample survey was designed to provide information on levels and trends
on fertility, infant and child mortality, family planning, and maternal and child health. Sur-
vey results are presented at the national level, by urban and rural residence, for each of the
five regions in the country, and for the 12 geographical regions for some of the survey topics.
Approximately 50% of the women in the survey were less than 30 years of age, 53% of the
females graduated from junior high school, while 93% were categorized as literate. Moreover,
31% of women had completed at least high school.
1.3.1 Dependent Education Variables
Individual education measures
For the education data, we use the “Respondents’ Background” section of the survey that
contains several schooling variables. The first variable is the schooling level of women,
which is a continuous variable ranging between 0 and 21 years of education. The second
variable is categorical, that reports the highest educational level attended by women - No
Education, Primary School, Junior High School, High School, and College/Above. We have
created relevant binary variables from the latter, depending on our outcome variables. For
example, three dependent variables capturing individual education levels are from the highest
educational level which women have attended: Junior High School (=1 if enrolled a junior
high school), High School (=1 if enrolled a high school), College/Above (=1 if enrolled a
College/ Above). Years of schooling has been used as a continuous variable.
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Intergenerational education mobility measures
For the intergenerational educational mobility variables, “the highest educational level en-
rolled of mothers/fathers of women” has also been converted into a binary variable as above.
Then we have created six measures of educational mobility. Three of them are created by
comparing the educational level between women and their mothers. For example, Junior
High School Mobility (Mother) =1 if women have ever enrolled a junior high (secondary)
school, but their mothers have never enrolled any junior high school; otherwise, it is 0. Also,
High School Mobility (Mother) =1 if women have ever enrolled a high school, but their
mothers have never enrolled in any high school; otherwise, it is 0. Finally, College Mobility
(Mother) =1 if women have ever enrolled in a College/Above educational level (College or
Master or Ph.D. level), but their mothers have never enrolled in any College/Above educa-
tional level; otherwise, it is 0. Three additional dependent variables are created by comparing
the educational level between women and their father and coded the same way. Unfortu-
nately, the survey does not have information on actual parental years of education, thereby
preventing from doing a parallel analysis of differences in years of education between women
and parents.
Labor Market Outcomes
For Labor Force Participation variables, we use both the conventional participation mea-
sures and more extraordinary measures specific to Turkey. First, we have binary variables
capturing employment statuses such as “ever worked” and “currently working” coded from
responses to the variations of the question: “Have you worked in a job since you were 12 for
at least 6 months”? We use two additional variables. First, we create a binary variable paid
versus unpaid job conditional on working. To capture the quality of the job, we create a
binary variable that equals one if the job paid social security. Since 2006, The Social Security
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Institution in Turkey has provided national social security for workers, and roughly 50% of
workers receive them (TDHS (2013)). In the absence of wage data, this variable serves as a
good proxy for what would be informally known as a ‘well-paid’ job. Though the latter two
variables can be used only in a selected sample, the results can offer additional insights in
terms of the quality of women’s employment, not only participation.
1.3.2 Control variables
For Control Variables, we use “birth-month” as a fixed effect (12 months) to control the
difference between birth months of women and school starting month. “26 region childhood”
as well as region fixed effect where women were born and lived until 12 years old are used to
control region difference where women lived until 12 years old. Also, ”Residence” is an area
effect whether women live at rural or urban area. We use that “Wealth Indices” (Poorest
– Poorer – Middle – Richer – Richest). It is created to combine data on a household’s
ownership of selected assets, such as televisions, bicycles, cars; materials used for housing
construction such as flooring materials; and types of water access and sanitation facilities,
etc. The last one is “Mother Tongue” an individual’s mother language (Turkish, Kurdish,
Arabic and other). Finally, we use the month-year of birth as a cluster. It should be the
best cluster variable in this study because our forcing variable takes form around our cut-off
point with birth months of years.
1.3.3 Sample Selection
As we mentioned in section 3, we use TDHS (2013). Before we measure the effect of the
law, we clear the data as we eliminate some missing observations. First of all, we start
with 11,794 households, with 9,746 women age between 15 and 49. Our focus group relies
on only women because of a decent number of observations to measure the impact of the
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law. Then we eliminate missing observations of the variables. For example, some individuals
have no information about their parents’ educational backgrounds, which our primary goal
to compare with individuals’ educational backgrounds. That is why we lost some observation
because of missing information. Moreover, as we have seen, that age group is too broad (15-
49), and our leading group should rely on around 26 years-old because of our cut-off point
(January-1987). So, as we have shown in section 3, our focus group age is between 18 and 34
because of our optimal bandwidths, which are mostly under 101 (as months). For example,
if optimal bandwidth is 60 for individuals’ high school education, it means our focus group’s
age is between 21 and 31 for high school education and so on. For labor force participation,
we lost a higher number of observations (over half the number of full observations) because
most of the women in Turkey have never attended in the labor market. In the end, we have
precise and reliable data to measure the effectiveness of the Law on women.
1.4 Empirical Strategy
We use a sharp regression discontinuity design to evaluate the causal impact of the CSL on
educational and labor market outcomes of children born just before and after January 01,
1987. Specifically, individuals born after the calendar year January 01-1987 are assigned to
the treatment group as when they were in 5th grade, dropping off in September 1997 was not
an option because of the compulsory schooling law. The compulsory schooling variation at
the junior high school level enables an estimate of the causal effects of extra years of schooling
on women’s subsequent higher educational achievement, both unconditional and conditional
on their parental education; and labor market outcomes. An important assumption is that
there is no systematic difference between individuals born in the year before the cutoff
year of 1987. In other words, the other variables associated with these outcomes are likely
to remain similar and continuous either side of the cutoff date. Since there was no other
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major event in Turkey around this time, there is no reason to believe otherwise. Given this
assumption, the outcomes of women born just before the cutoff provide reasonable estimates
of the counterfactual outcomes of those born just after the cutoff. This causal interpretation
of regression discontinuity estimates uses the potential outcomes framework as formalized in
Hahn et al. (2001). Though the estimates are arguably local around the cut-off date, as long
as individuals do not have precise control over their children’s birthdates anticipating future
policy changes, a reasonable assumption to make in this context, the variation in eligibility
for additional years of schooling can be assumed to be as good as randomized near the cutoff
date (Imbens and Lemieux (2008)). We formalize the statistical relationship between the
compulsory schooling law and educational and labor market outcomes using Equation 1.1
below. We estimate a local linear regression on either side of the cutoff date, January 01,
1987, allowing for different levels and trends in the outcome. We also impose linearity around
the eligibility threshold and estimate the effects using the standard ordinary least squares
estimation (Lee and Lemieux (2010)).
Yi = α + β ∗ Ti + γ1 ∗Di + γ2 ∗ (Ti ×Di) + Γ ∗ Zi + ui, (1.1)
Where Yi is the relevant individual educational or labor market outcome and binary in all
our specifications. For example, the Junior High School indicator variable is equal to 1 if the
individual has enrolled in junior high school, and zero otherwise. Also, the College/Above
indicator variable is equal to 1 if the individual has enrolled in college or more than college
as a Master/Ph.D. level and so on. On the right-hand side, Ti is the treatment assignment
(binary) variable based on the birth month. It is equal to 1 if the birth occurred on or
after January 01, 1987, and the person received the treatment (covered by the CSL) and 0
otherwise (control). Our forcing variable in the date of birth Di which is normalized to zero
at the cutoff point. The interaction term allows for a different trend before and after the
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implementation date (Ti × Di). Finally, ui is an individual specific disturbance term. The
primary parameter of interest in the equation is β, which is the size of the discrete change in
the outcome at the cutoff date for the CSL. We conduct optimal bandwidth selection using
the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2009) procedure, which requires the selection of an optimal
bandwidth for each outcome variable under consideration. We also control for fixed effects
for the birth months, the 26 regions where women were born and lived until 12 years old,
residence whether women live at rural or urban area, a categorical variable which is a wealth
index, and mother tongue an individual’s mother language (Turkish, Kurdish, Arabic and
other). Finally, following Lee and Card (2008), we cluster standard errors at the month-year
of the birth level to correct for any potential specification error in the forcing variable.
1.5 Results
1.5.1 Educational Transition Matrices
Before presenting estimates from these models, we examine the intergenerational transition
of educational achievements across different levels of schooling for the sample of women who
are included in the optimal bandwidth. The results are reported by the transition matrices
in Table 1.1 & Table 1.2, that show mobility patterns across the education distribution with
respect to both parents, an exercise similar to Aydemir and Yazici (2017). An education
transition matrix shows education levels of daughters (shown in columns) against the edu-
cation levels of their mother or father (shown in rows). We show four matrices, two with
respect to each parent, corresponding to treatment and control groups. We consider five
educational categories - No education, Primary School, Junior High School, High School,
and College (and above). To understand the potential upward mobility, one has to examine
the cells to the right of the diagonal. For example, what is the percentage of women who
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enrolled in junior high school and above conditional on their mothers’ schooling level being
only primary school? Table 1.1 shows this information both for treatment and the control
group (women who were not subject to the compulsory schooling law because they were born
a few months before the cutoff date). While there is upward educational mobilities among
both treatment and control group women, the gradient was sharper for the treatment group
with respect to their mothers’ education level. A cursory look at the elements to the right
of the diagonal of the matrices reveals that the later generation achieved higher levels of
education in general, except for the highest, college-level.
One welfare concern is if intergenerational persistence is especially pronounced at the
bottom of the education distribution: children who are born to parents with little or no
education also being stuck at the bottom of the distribution. We start by considering the
control group, women who were not subject to the compulsory schooling law. For this
group, 19% of the women whose mothers had no education went on to attend junior high
school and high school. For women whose mothers had primary education had a steeper
increase in the educational mobility ladder, as more than 25% attend college. However,
the mobility rates are higher for the treatment group. First, for daughters of mothers who
did not have junior high school education, rates both junior high school enrollment and high
school enrollment were higher. The former is not surprising as the law required these cohorts
to attend junior high school, but the rates of high school attendance show the second-order
effects of the reform. Specifically, for the treatment group, a stunning 92% of women whose
mothers had only primary school education had mobility upward from the bottom of the
distribution. Finally, one other measure previous research has focused on is the bottom-to-
top probability, which measures the probability that a child belongs to the top education
category (college and above) when the parent is at the bottom of the education distribution
(less than primary education). The treatment group matrix shows that success rates for
these measures are quite high, at 9.89% and 33.77%, respectively. Though findings remain
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qualitatively similar for the control group, the magnitudes are much smaller. Similarly, when
one considers father-daughter transition matrices, despite some evidence of upward mobility,
the strength of such mobility is weaker.
It is worth noting that an essential outlier between the treatment and control group is
college enrollment. While 85% of women whose mothers attended college attend college
themselves among the control group, the comparable rate is only 81% in the treatment
group. There are two possible explanations for this phenomenon. First, as we have tried to
argue above, compulsory schooling laws at the junior high school level may change little for
families with high educational background, where women go to college. Second, since the
treatment group is younger by design, the rate of college enrollment is mechanically lower. In
other words, there is persistence at the top of the intergenerational distribution, something
previous research has also found in Turkey (Aydemir and Yazici (2019)).
1.5.2 Internal Validity of the RD design
First, we check for one internal validity measure, whether the treatment and control groups
do vary significantly in terms of pre-treatment characteristics. To test this assumption, we
compare the means of a set of pre-treatment characteristics, including demographic factors
like ethnicity, economic factors like wealth, parental education, and location between the two
groups. Table 1.3 presents these results. The columns report the means of the treatment
and control groups and p-values from the corresponding t-tests, respectively. The sample
corresponds to a bandwidth of 60, the lowest of the bandwidths used in the subsequent RD
regression analysis.
The Table 1.3 shows that most of the differences are statistically insignificant at the 5%
level, which lends credence to our strategy. One exception is mothers’ lack of schooling
and father’s primary education, where a higher proportion of treatment group women have
fathers with primary education. This is expected as levels of schooling increased the length
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of our bandwidth (5 years), meaning that the proportion of men with only primary education
fell over time. Next, we check whether the CSL impacted the amount of schooling at all.
Recent evidence from the schooling law shows that types of compliance were different across
gender, labor market characteristics, income, and religiosity. If the law were valid, there
would be a robust first-order effect in terms of an increase in junior high school enrollment.
The change is shown visually in Figure A.1 (a), where the sharp increase in the enrollment
in junior high school among women who came under the purview of the law is seen clearly.
This is also translated into an increase in a number of years of education, which can be seen
in Figure A.1 (b).
Additionally, Table 1.4 presents the summary statistics of our treatment and control
group samples for our key-dependent and independent variables. They correspond to band-
width = 60, the lowest among our various specifications. Unsurprisingly, the treatment
cohort, which is also older on average, have higher rates of school enrollment at all levels.
They also have slightly higher rates of labor market outcomes like better jobs (jobs with
social security).
1.5.3 Impact on Individual High School and College Enrollment
The Regression Discontinuity (RD) results Equation 1.1 using two binary dependent variables
are shown in Table 1.5. Columns (1) and (2) are binary dependent variables, High School –
College/Above, which they take the value of 1 if individual i has attended educational level
that we examine the effect of the law on. Otherwise, they are 0.
Table 1.5 presents the results of the effect of the Law on individual enrollment in high
school among women in Turkey. Linear RD result with optimal bandwidth h=79 at column
(1) shows there is a statistically significant effect of 5.3 ppt (or 12 percentage relatives to
the mean) on high school enrollment. Therefore, our evidence suggests that compulsory
schooling at a lower level did positively affect enrollments at a higher level of schooling in
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Turkey. Furthermore, Figure 1.3 shows some evidence of positive jumps at discontinuity
that support these estimates. The evidence on college enrollment is mixed. The estimate
in column (2) indicates that although the reform increased the college/above educational
enrollment (at optimal bandwidth h=60) for the treatment cohort, such effects are not
significant after we control for various other variables. The visual evidence, based on the
model without any control variables, though does show an upward jump at the discontinuity
in Figure 1.4.
1.5.4 Impact on Intergenerational Mobility in High School and
College Enrollment
Next, we examine the potential impact of the CSL on intergenerational educational mobility
in terms of the difference in schooling achievement between respondent women and their
mother/father. Table 1.6 presents estimates from similar linear RD models with optimal
bandwidth. To recall, the dependent variables in Columns (1) and (2) are binary variables
that take value 1 if an individual woman has enrolled in high school and college respectively,
while the highest education achievements of her parents are below those levels. Panel A
reports estimates with respect to mother’s schooling. Linear RD model with optimal band-
width h=103 shows that there is a statistically significant effect of 6 ppt (or 18 percentage
relatives to the mean) on high school enrollment. However, the result of the column (2)
indicates that the effect of the reform is statistically insignificant at 2.9 ppt on College and
above enrollment at optimal bandwidth h=62. The pattern is somewhat the same for mo-
bility with respect to father’s education, where there is a statistically significant effect of
3.3 ppt on high school enrollment (at 10% level) but the effect is not significant on college
enrollment. Figure 1.5, 1.6, 1.7 and 1.8 show the graphical counterparts of these results,
where the sharp increases can be seen in both cases.
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The gender dimension of these results requires some attention. Given the gender dis-
parities in educational attendance, it is unsurprising that the effect is more significant with
respect to mothers. Since there is less variation in educational enrollment among men, their
daughters’ outcomes conditional on those levels are also likely to exhibit less variation. Fi-
nally, the demographic profile of the treatment group is rather young. For example, the
optimal bandwidth for Panel A in Table 1.6, column (2) is 62, which means that the sample
includes women born in 1993, who was 19 years-old in 2012. Therefore, some of them were
not old enough to go to college.
1.5.5 Heterogeneity across Rural and Urban Areas
In 1996, Turkey entered the European Union as a customs union and started preparing
for full membership for the future. Turkish government determined that it should attain
educational parity with other EU countries to better negotiate for the full membership. One
of the main goals to improve educational parity is by increasing overall levels of education
and on reducing geographic and gender-specific educational disparities.
As we mentioned, one of the main goals of the policy is reducing geographic disparities
that result from Table 1.7 support in terms of junior high school. First of all, all results in
Panel A are highly statistically significant. For individuals who lived until 12 years old at
rural area, the result of the column (1), there is highly statistically significant effect of 20.7
ppt and result of the column (3), for individuals who lived until 12 years old at urban area,
there is highly statistically significant effect of 10.7 ppt. When we compare area as Rural
and Urban in terms of individual, we come through the policy reduced geographic disparity.
Moreover, for educational mobility between individuals and their mothers, the result of the
column (2) indicates that there is a statistically significant effect of 15.6 ppt in the rural
area, and there is again a highly statistically significant effect of 8.8 ppt in the urban area.
Again, when we compare them in terms of areas, we find out the effect of the policy in the
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rural area almost two times the impact of the policy in urban areas. Table 1.7, Panel B
shows results of heterogeneity at a high educational level. However, the results are mostly
statistically insignificant. Lacking high education facilities in the rural area should cause
there is not any significant effect of the law on a high educational level. On the other hand,
the result of column (3), individuals’ high school enrollment in the urban area, indicate there
is a statistically significant effect of 7.8 ppt. Furthermore, we find a statistically significant
(at 10% level) result effect of the law on educational mobility between individuals and their
mother in the urban area.
1.5.6 Labor Market Outcome Measures
Finally, we examine if additional years of schooling impacted women’s labor market out-
comes. One important caveat is that the highest age of our treatment group cohort is 26.
This means that for many of them, long terms implications for the labor market cannot be
known. The inference is also problematic from our empirical strategy because even though
the control group can be a few years older, they may have a substantially higher likelihood
of joining the labor market. Ironically, during the early adult years, attending college auto-
matically reduces the probability of joining the labor market. Nevertheless, since the current
literature only looks at the participation rates, it worth going more in-depth and investigate
the multiplex nature of labor market outcomes.
Table 1.8 summarizes the labor market outcomes. The two panels A and B report results
corresponding to the current labor market and lifetime (ever) labor market outcomes, respec-
tively. As far as the current labor force participation is concerned, there is no statistically
significant evidence that women under the CSL have higher rates of participation. However,
when we look into the quality of jobs, they seem to have either paid jobs or jobs with social
security benefits at higher rates. The pattern is somewhat different for lifetime work. The
treatment group women have a significantly higher rate of labor force participation, but no
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significant difference with respect to a paid job. They still have a higher likelihood of getting
a better job that pays social security. These latter results are consistent with our schooling
results. While overall the labor force participation effect is not insignificant, unlike found by
several studies such as Gulesci and Meyersson (2015) and Güneş (2015), the types of labor
market effects can be more nuanced.
1.5.7 Placebo tests
If the effect of the 1987 CSL is correctly identified, intergenerational mobility in parent-
child levels of education should not differ sharply on either side of an arbitrary cut-off year.
One way to test this is to pick an arbitrary year, pretend that there was a policy change,
and see if our outcome variables change sharply at the cut-off point. Panels A and B in
Table 1.9 report our placebo test results in terms of junior high school and in terms of high
school attendance respectively for an artificially created cut-off point (January 1980) to test
whether we see any jumps similar to our primary RD model.
The results for junior high school indicate that there is no statistically significant effect
on schooling outcomes of women and educational mobility between individuals and their
parents. Similarly, the test results of high school in Table 1.9 indicate that there is a
statistically significant negative effect on both individual schooling outcomes of women and
educational mobility between individuals and their parents. These results are logical as there
was no actual drastic change in educational policy in Turkey in 1980.
1.6 Discussion
In this paper, we have estimated the effects of an increase in years of schooling at the
secondary level on high school and college enrollment for women in Turkey, both at the indi-
vidual level and conditional on their parents’ levels of education. Our identifying variation
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comes from a schooling reform that exogenously increased schooling between two successive
cohorts of women. Our empirical strategy exploits this sharp discontinuity in the years of
compulsory schooling between women born before and after the qualification cutoff date
allowing us to use a sharp Regression Discontinuity Design. The strategy meets two require-
ments for the internal validity of such a strategy. First, it is required that the cut-off point
is exogenous to the individual schooling choice. Since the reform was influenced by external
forces like Turkey’s admission to the EU, individuals did not have a chance to adjust their
eligibility to the treatment. Second, there were no other relevant ways in which observations
on one side of the cutoff-point were treated differently from those on the other side in any
systematic way. Finally, since most of the children were already in school when the reform
happened, the issues of non-compliance were also minimal.
We find that the reform led to an increase in both unconditional junior high school and
high school enrollment among women in Turkey. Additionally, it led to some intergener-
ational upward mobility. We find that the rate at which women achieved higher levels of
education compared to their mothers’ level was higher for the treatment group (cohort who
were part of the reform) compared to the control group. Such intergenerational upward
mobility was weaker when compared to fathers and also at the highest levels of education,
such as college and above. Furthermore, mandatory education seems to lead women to get
better jobs, though there is no significant impact on the labor force participation rate at the
extensive margin.
Our results indicate that there is significant regional heterogeneity in the effects. In
particular, supply-side factors may have impacted the educational outcomes in the end. For
example, we find that in the rural areas, the impact of the reform is limited at the high school
level, presumably because there were not enough high schools already built to accommodate
the additional student flows.
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The last point brings up one of the few limitations of the study in its present form. In
our empirical analysis, we do not control any supply-side factors. This matters less for our
methodology of sharp RD design as we are comparing the cohorts born only a few months
apart when physical infrastructure is likely to remain unchanged. However, other factors, like
the supply of teachers, may affect our results. Another limitation is that our study is only
limited to women, though that is a direct result of the data we use. Nevertheless, the overall
trends in the educational gender gap suggest that the difference started shrinking sharply
after the reform. Our household survey-based micro evidence supports and explains such
country-wide macro trends. Addressing such gender biases is key to both eliminating gender
inequality and promoting intergenerational educational upward mobility in the long-run.
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Table 1.1: Transition Matrices for Intergenerational Schooling Enrollment
(Mother vs Individual)
















No Education 19.61 56.27 8.92 10.21 4.98 100
Primary School 2.10 35.43 12.67 24.29 25.52 100
Junior High School 0.00 8.11 4.05 44.59 43.24 100
High School 0.00 1.02 2.04 20.41 76.53 100
College/Above 0.00 0.00 3.03 12.12 84.85 100
















No Education 17.50 24.46 28.80 19.35 9.89 100
Primary School 1.49 8.07 24.74 31.93 33.77 100
Junior High School 0.00 2.19 11.68 30.66 55.47 100
High School 0.00 0.00 2.80 19.63 77.57 100
College/Above 0.00 0.00 0.00 19.05 80.95 100
Note: Tables are created by bandwidth h=100. Control is between h=-100 and h=-1. Treatment
is between h=0 and h=100.
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Table 1.2: Transition Matrices for Intergenerational Schooling Enrollment
(Father vs Individual)
















No Education 32.39 53.29 5.16 6.34 2.82 100
Primary School 7.25 51.10 11.67 17.47 12.50 100
Junior High School 1.93 20.29 14.49 30.43 32.85 100
High School 0.43 13.25 8.12 28.21 50.00 100
College/Above 0.00 6.45 2.42 20.97 70.16 100
















No Education 26.50 28.08 28.39 11.04 5.99 100
Primary School 5.92 15.76 28.90 29.05 20.37 100
Junior High School 1.75 4.90 19.93 33.57 39.86 100
High School 1.49 1.87 10.45 27.61 58.58 100
College/Above 0.74 1.48 0.74 16.30 80.74 100
Note: Tables are created by bandwidth h=100. Control is between h=-100 and h=-1. Treatment
is between h=0 and h=100.
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Tables are created by bandwidth h=60. Values, inside the parenthesis, are Standard Error.
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Table 1.5: Impact of Compulsory Schooling Law on
Women’s (individual) Education
(1) (2)
Linear RD Linear RD
Variables High School College/Above
Treatment 0.053** 0.034
[0.025] [0.025]
Mean of Dependent 0.387 0.152
Observations 3,823 2,836
Note: Table shows some Linear RD results with optimal bandwidth that is effect of Compulsory School Law
on Education Enrollment (High School and College/Above) for All Women. We use five control/covariate
variables. These are birth month (as fixed effect), region26 childhood (where they lived until 12 years old),
residence (whether they are currently living in rural/urban), wealth (Poorest, Poorer, Middle, Richer, Rich-
est), mother tongue (Turkish, Kurdish, Arabic, other). Each column has own optimal bandwidth h. Means
are obtained from the full sample of the data.
Furthermore, Column 1 shows High School that is a binary variable. High School=1 If an individual has
enrolled a high school at least or at least 11 years of schooling. Otherwise, it is 0. Moreover, Column 2
indicates College/Above that is a binary variable. College/Above=1 If an individual has enrolled a college
at least or more than a college as Master/PhD level education. Otherwise, it is 0.
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Table 1.6: Impact of Compulsory Schooling Law on Women’s Intergenerational Mobility
with Respect to Parental Education
Panel A: Conditional on Mother’s Education
(1) (2)
Linear RD Linear RD
Variables High School College/Above
Treatment 0.060** 0.029
[0.024] [0.025]
Mean of Dependent 0.343 0.145
Observations 4,936 2,962
Panel B: Conditional on Father’s Education
(1) (2)
Linear RD Linear RD
Variables High School College/Above
Treatment 0.033* 0.024
[0.020] [0.027]
Mean of Dependent 0.285 0.129
Observations 6,853 2,945
Note: Table shows some Linear RD results with optimal bandwidth that is effect of Compulsory School
Law on Education Level Difference Between Individual and Her Mother in panel A or between Individual
and Her Father in panel B. We use five control/covariate variables. These are birth month (as fixed effect),
region26 childhood (where they lived until 12 years old), residence (whether they are currently living in
rural/urban), wealth (Poorest, Poorer, Middle, Richer, Richest), mother tongue (Turkish, Kurdish, Arabic,
other). Each column has own optimal bandwidth h. Means are obtained from the full sample of the data.
Furthermore, Column 1s show High School that are binary variables. High School=1 If an individual has
enrolled a high school at least or at least 11 years of schooling but her mother, in panel A, or her father, in
panel B, has never enrolled any high school. Otherwise, it is 0. Moreover, Column 2s indicate College/Above
that are also binary variables. College/Above=1 If an individual has enrolled a college at least or more than
any college as Master/PhD level education but her mother, in panel A, or her father, in panel B, has never
enrolled any college at least zero otherwise.
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Table 1.7: Heterogeneity in the Impacts of Compulsory Schooling Law on
Women’s Education
Panel A: Junior High School
(1) (2) (3) (4)














Treatment 0.207*** 0.156*** 0.107*** 0.088***
[0.032] [0.038] [0.023] [0.031]
Mean of Dependent 0.294 0.282 0.674 0.554
Observations 2,170 1,596 4,253 3,480
Panel B: High School
(1) (2) (3) (4)














Treatment 0.010 0.011 0.078** 0.057*
[0.024] [0.023] [0.034] [0.033]
Mean of Dependent 0.159 0.155 0.536 0.466
Observations 2,405 2,633 2,635 3,357
Note: Table shows some Linear RD results with optimal bandwidth that is Heterogeneity in the effect of
Compulsory School Law on Education enrollment for individuals and also on Education Level Difference
Between Individual and Her Mother in terms of jr. high school in panel A or in terms of high school in
panel B. We use five control/covariate variables. These are birth month (as fixed effect), region26 childhood
(where they lived until 12 years old), residence (whether they are currently living in rural/urban), wealth
(Poorest, Poorer, Middle, Richer, Richest), mother tongue (Turkish, Kurdish, Arabic, other). Each column
has own optimal bandwidth h. Means are obtained from the full sample of the data.
Moreover, Panel B shows whether high school education has been increased in terms of rural/urban areas.
For example, column 1 and 3 indicate that individuals’ junior high school education enrollment has been
affected in terms of rural/urban areas by the law. Moreover, column 2 and 4 shows whether the law has
effect on educational level difference (by high school enrollment) between an individual and her mother in
terms of rural/ urban areas.
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Table 1.8: Impacts of Compulsory Schooling Law on Women’s
Labor Market Outcomes
Panel A: Current Labor Market Outcomes
(1) (2) (3)









Treatment 0.017 0.098** 0.195***
[0.040] [0.042] [0.060]
Mean of Dependent 0.326 0.636 0.522
Observations 1,667 1,402 746
Panel B: Lifetime Labor Market Outcomes
(1) (2) (3)









Treatment 0.066*** 0.026 0.109**
[0.024] [0.027] [0.043]
Mean of Dependent 0.458 0.747 0.458
Observations 4,439 2,209 2,125
Note: Table shows some Linear RD results with optimal bandwidth that is effect of Compulsory School Law
on Current labor market outcomes in Panel A and Lifetime labor market outcomes in Panel B for all indi-
viduals. We use five control/covariate variables. These are birth month (as fixed effect), region26 childhood
(where they lived until 12 years old), residence (whether they are currently living in rural/urban), wealth
(Poorest, Poorer, Middle, Richer, Richest), mother tongue (Turkish, Kurdish, Arabic, other). Each column
has own optimal bandwidth h. Means are obtained from the full sample of the data.
Furthermore, Panel A shows Currently Working is a binary variable. Currently Working=1 if an individual
currently has a job zero otherwise. Moreover, Column 2 indicates that Non-Paid Work vs Paid Work is also
binary variable which equals to 1 if an individual has currently Paid Job. Column 3 shows Job Offers Social
Security is also binary variable that equals to one if an individual currently has a job which offers social
security zero otherwise.
Moreover, Panel B shows Ever Worked is a binary variable. Ever Worked=1 if an individual has ever a
job in her lifetime zero otherwise. Moreover, Column 2 indicates that Non-Paid Work vs Paid Work is also
binary variable which equals to 1 if an individual has ever Paid Job. Column 3 shows Job Offers Social
Security is also binary variable that equals one if an individual has ever a job which offers social security
zero otherwise.
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Table 1.9: Placebo Tests
Panel A: Junior High School
(1) (2) (3)











Treatment 0.013 0.038 -0.014
[0.025] [0.030] [0.027]
Mean of Dependent 0.524 0.446 0.338
Observations 2,737 2,852 3,073
Panel B: High School
(1) (2) (3)











Treatment -0.042* -0.042* -0.063***
[0.023] [0.024] [0.022]
Mean of Dependent 0.387 0.343 0.285
Observations 3,786 3,713 4,141
Note: Table shows some Linear RD results with optimal bandwidth that is effect of Compulsory School Law
on Placebo test of Junior High School enrollment for All Women and for difference between all women and
their parents in terms of Jr.High school in Panel A and in terms of High School in Panel B. We use five
control/covariate variables. These are birth month (as fixed effect), region26 childhood (where they lived
until 12 years old), residence (whether they are currently living in rural/urban), wealth (Poorest, Poorer,
Middle, Richer, Richest), mother tongue (Turkish, Kurdish, Arabic, other). Each column has own optimal
bandwidth h. Means are obtained from the full sample of the data.
Furthermore, Panel A shows Junior High School that is a binary variable in panel A. Column 1 shows Jr
High School=1 If an individual has enrolled a junior high school at least. Otherwise, it is 0. Moreover,
Column 2 indicates Junior High School=1 If an individual has enrolled a junior high school at least but her
mother has never enrolled any junior high school. Otherwise, it is 0. Column 3 shows Junior High School=1
If an individual has enrolled a junior high school at least but her father has never enrolled any junior high
school. Otherwise, it is 0.
Moreover, Panel B shows High School that is a binary variable in panel B. Column 1 shows High School=1 If
an individual has enrolled a high school at least or at least 11 years of schooling. Otherwise, it is 0. Moreover,
Column 2 indicates High School=1 If an individual has enrolled a high school at least or but her mother
has never enrolled any high school. Otherwise, it is 0. Column 3 shows High School=1 If an individual has
enrolled a high school at least but her father has never enrolled any high school, zero otherwise
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Figure 1.1: The Gender Gap Ratio (8 Years of Schooling)
Figure 1.2: The Gender Gap Ratio (11 Years of Schooling)
Note: Educational Gender Ratio; it indicates the relative greatness of female gross schooling ratio as
compared to male gross schooling ratio in specific educational year and level of education. It is obtained by
dividing the female gross schooling by the male gross schooling ratio multiplied 100.
Source: Turkish Statistical Institute
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Figure 1.3: High School Enrollment (Individual)
Figure 1.4: College/Above Enrollment (Individual)
Note: Data are from the 2013 Turkish Demographic Health Survey. The figures plot a dummy variable
equals to one if the individual enrolls respective school level and zero otherwise. The vertical dashed line in
each graph represents the Cut-off point, 01-1987, is 0. It implied that individuals born after 01-1987 (right
side of 0 at horizontal axe) have to complete 8 years of schooling, whereas those born before 01-1987 (left
side of 0 at horizontal axe) do not have to complete 8 year of schooling. Gray dashed lines show 95 percent
confidence intervals around the mean level. All figures are created by using bandwidths between h=-100 to
h=100.
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Figure 1.5: High School Enrollment (Individual vs Her Mother)
Figure 1.6: College/Above Enrollment (Individual vs Her Mother)
Note: Data are from the 2013 Turkish Demographic Health Survey. The figures plot a dummy variable
equals to one if the individual enrolls at least respective school level, but her mother has never enrolled
respective school level; zero otherwise. The vertical dashed line in each graph represents the Cut-off point,
01-1987, is 0. It implied that individuals born after 01-1987 (right side of 0 at horizontal axe) have to
complete 8 years of schooling, whereas those born before 01-1987 (left side of 0 at horizontal axe) do not
have to complete 8 year of schooling. Gray dashed lines show 95 percent confidence intervals around the
mean level. All figures are created by using bandwidths between h=-100 to h=100.
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Figure 1.7: High School Enrollment (Individual vs Her Father)
Figure 1.8: College/Above Enrollment (Individual vs Her Father)
Note: Data are from the 2013 Turkish Demographic Health Survey. The figures plot a dummy variable
equals to one if the individual enrolls at least respective school level, but her father has never enrolled
respective school level; zero otherwise. The vertical dashed line in each graph represents the Cut-off point,
01-1987, is 0. It implied that individuals born after 01-1987 (right side of 0 at horizontal axe) have to
complete 8 years of schooling, whereas those born before 01-1987 (left side of 0 at horizontal axe) do not
have to complete 8 year of schooling. Gray dashed lines show 95 percent confidence intervals around the
mean level. All figures are created by using bandwidths between h=-100 to h=100.
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Figure 1.9: Current Labor Market Outcomes
(a) Currently Working (b) Non-Paid Job vs Paid Job (Currently)
(c) Currently Working with Social Security
Note: Data are from the 2013 Turkish Demographic Health Survey. The figures plot a dummy variable
equals to one if the individual is 1) Currently Working, 2) Currently Having a Paid Work and 3) Currently
Working at a job which offers Social Security, zero otherwise. The vertical dashed line in each graph represents
the Cut-off point, 01-1987, is 0. It implied that individuals born after 01-1987 (right side of 0 at horizontal
axe) have to complete 8 years of schooling, whereas those born before 01-1987 (left side of 0 at horizontal
axe) do not have to complete 8 year of schooling. Gray dashed lines show 95 percent confidence intervals
around the mean level. All figures are created by using bandwidths between h=-100 to h=100.
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Figure 1.10: Lifetime Labor Market Outcomes
(a) Ever Worked (b) Non-Paid Job vs Paid Job (Lifetime)
(c) Ever Worked with Social Security
Note: Data are from the 2013 Turkish Demographic Health Survey. The figures plot a dummy variable
equals to one if the individual has 1) Ever Worked, 2) Ever Have a Paid Work and 3) Ever Worked at a job
which offers Social Security, zero otherwise. The vertical dashed line in each graph represents the Cut-off
point, 01-1987, is 0. It implied that individuals born after 01-1987 (right side of 0 at horizontal axe) have
to complete 8 years of schooling, whereas those born before 01-1987 (left side of 0 at horizontal axe) do not
have to complete 8 year of schooling. Gray dashed lines show 95 percent confidence intervals around the
mean level. All figures are created by using bandwidths between h=-100 to h=100.
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Figure 1.11: Balanced Covariate
(a) Birth Month (b) Mother Tongue
(c) Regions (d) Residence (Urban vs Rural)
(e) Regions
Note: Data is from 2013 TDHS. Figures show predetermined covariates in monthly bins against the forcing variables 8 years within the threshold
of being born in January 1987. A test of the null hypothesis that the discontinuity jumps in all graphs are jointly zero. 95 percent confidence
intervals are plotted in dash lines around the mean level. The vertical line in each graph represents the Cut-off point between 01-1987 is 0. It
implied that individuals born after 01-1987 (right side of 0 at horizontal axe) have to complete 8 years of schooling, whereas those born before
01-1987 (left side of 0 at horizontal axe) do not have to complete 8 year of schooling.
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Figure 1.12: McCrary Density Test
Note: Data are from the 2013 TDHS. The graph shows the results of the McCrary test of whether there is
a discontinuity in the density of the forcing variable, the month of birth.
Chapter 2
The Effects of Compulsory Schooling
Law on Reproductive Health
Behavior in Turkey
2.1 Introduction
Economists have sought the impact of education on several topics as maternal health, child
health, wage, human capital, etc. for a long time, and continue to research. Furthermore,
most of the researches were practiced in developed countries. Recently, few studies attempted
to estimate the effect of education in developing countries. In this context, this study
uses a natural experiment as Compulsory Schooling Law (CSL) in Turkey, which increases
compulsory schooling from five years to eight years in 1997, to estimate the causal effect
of maternal education on reproductive health behavior. The reproductive health behavior
comprises of pregnancy behaviors, namely the number of antenatal visits, birth weight,
an examination from a professional/a non-professional, and preferences for reproductivity,
namely contraceptive usage, number of desired children, preference of children gender.
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Economists do agree that education has an impact on child health, through more educa-
tion, improves parents’ well-being, and the well-being of their children. Also, more educated
parents are more efficient in producing healthy children (Grossman (2006)). Some of the
previous studies estimate the effect of education on maternal health and child health. For
example, Currie and Moretti (2003) analyze the relationship between maternal health and
child health in terms of birth weight by using an instrument that is an available college in
a place where the woman lives at aged 17. They found that education changes maternal
behavior which reduces the incidence of low birth weight. Moreover, their findings indicate
that an increase in maternal education has a positive effect on antenatal visits and care. An-
other example of child health in terms of birth weight is Chou et al. (2010). They investigate
the impact of parental education on the probability of low birth weight by using a middle
school expansion in Taiwan. They find that an increase in schooling lowers the probability
of an infant who will be born light or will die in the neonatal or post-neonatal periods.
On the other hand, Lindeboom et al. (2009) investigate the effect of postponing school
exit in the UK, and they find that it has little effect on child health as well as maternal health.
Moreover, McCrary and Royer (2011) find education has a small impact on infant health
(as birth weight and infant mortality). They find the education does not affect prenatal
behaviors (as smoking and antenatal care) by using school entry policy in California and
Texas. These findings provide a result which the effect of maternal education on child health
or their health behavior are based on cultural and institutional difference by the countries
where they live.
Several studies examine the role of maternal education in reproductivity preference as a
contraceptive method and usage, number of births, etc. For instance, Osili and Long (2008)
used the Universal Primary Education program in Nigeria to estimate the effect of maternal
schooling on the number of births. They find that maternal education decreased the number
of early childbirths. Again, Currie and Moretti (2003) show that maternal education has
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a negative effect on fertility. Breierova and Duflo (2004) estimate the impact of parental
education on productivity and child mortality by using IV methodology. They find that
parental education has an essential role in very early fertility before the age of 15 but has
no role in early pregnancy before the age of 25.
Some previous studies have investigated the impact of maternal education on child health,
child mortality, women’s fertility, women’s empowerment, and religious outcome, etc. in
Turkey. These studies used the previous version of TDHS as 2003, 2008. For example,
Dinçer et al. (2014) estimate the effect of women’s schooling on women’s fertility, empow-
erment, and child mortality by using IV methodology. They report some evidence that the
impact of maternal education has a negative effect on productivity as the number of preg-
nancies and child mortality. However, there is no effect on women’s empowerment. Gulesci
and Meyersson (2015) use THDS 2008 to investigate the impact of CSL on women em-
powerment and religious outcome in Turkey by using RD design. They find the effect of
the additional one year by CSL had significant secularizing as well as empowering impacts.
Güneş (2015) explores the causal relationship between maternal education, non-market out-
comes, and market outcomes by using IV methodology. She reports there is a significant
effect of maternal education on child health, and maternal education leads to reduce fertility,
reduce smoking, etc. However, there are no significant results on prenatal care, labor force
participation, and occupation.
This study investigates whether the women’s additional years of schooling increased by
CSL has any significant impact on reproductive health behavior which as I defined above
that consists of the pregnancy behavior, namely the number of antenatal visits, birth weight,
an examination from a professional/a non-professional, and the preference of productivity,
namely contraceptive usage, number of desired children, preference of child gender. I use
Regression Discontinuity Design as an estimation strategy. I defined the forcing variable
by using the calendar year as the law counts age. However, Gulesci and Meyersson (2015)
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use the school year to measure the target group that causes some degree of error. Unlike
previous studies, I take advantage of the latest version of TDHS 2013. The results, as I
report, show that maternal education increases knowledge of health care service, so it leads
to an increase in antenatal visits and increases to be more aware to have an examination
from a professional. There is no significant result of the effect on birth weight.
Furthermore, estimations indicate more education increases contraceptive usage, and in
this context number of desired children decreased. Finally, there is no significant effect of
more education on the preference of child gender. Since as Grossman (2006) mentioned,
more educated parents care about healthy children, not their gender.
2.2 Overview of the Compulsory Schooling Law Change
in Turkey
Before the 1997 compulsory schooling law (CSL), the main education system included five
years of primary school, three years of junior high school, and three years of high school.
The primary school was mandatory. However, Junior high school and High school as the
other two-component of the main education system were non-compulsory. Students had a
chance to choose vocational schools, secular schools, or religious schools for the voluntary
components of the main education system.
In 1996, Turkey took a chance to become a permanent member of the European Union
by attending the European Customs Union. However, the low rate of school attendance in
Turkey was a disadvantage for full membership in the EU negotiations. In the meantime,
Political Islam was popular in the Middle East during the 1990s. Besides, political Islam had
taken place in Turkey, and it had increased its popularity in public too, which led an Islamist
party to win the 1995 national elections. This situation disturbed the secular political groups
and the military. Moreover, the judiciary strongly alleged the Islamic party impressed the
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youth population by controlling the religious schools and extracurricular religious study
centers.
In 1997, the National Security Council convened and took precautions to prevent the
growing political Islamic trend in the country. They announced eighteen recommendations
as known as 28 February military memorandum (or post-modern coup). One of the recom-
mendations was the extension of compulsory schooling from 5 years to 8 years as secular
schooling. It means there was no more junior high school as religious schooling. On August
16th 1997, the Turkish parliament passed Law No. 4306, known as the Basic Education Pro-
gram, which combined primary school and junior high school to extend compulsory schooling
from 5 to 8 years. The law became effective in the 1997-98 school year, which means if a stu-
dent graduated from a primary school in 1997, she/he could drop out. Also, the law implies
that a child when she/he turns six years old should attend a primary school in September
of the year, which means if a child was born before January 1987, she/he could drop out.
The program also aimed to extend some demands as the number of teachers and the
number of schools/ classrooms. In this context of the supply-side of the education, the
Ministry of National Education proposed to construct 3,900 new schools and to add 15,300
classrooms to existing schools and to recruit additional 150,000 teachers and inspectors for
primary education schools (Dulger (2004)). The government built 104,000 new classrooms,
a 53% increase over 1996, and recruit 70,000 additional primary school teachers, a 22%
increase over 1996, between 1997 and 2003.
From 1997 to 2000, the number of students increased from 9,084,635 students to 10,480,721
students (Turkish Statistical Institute). In 1996, the gender gap was 14% between boys and
girls in primary school enrollment. The gap decreased sharply and got eliminated until 2011,
and it also reversed after this period in favor of girls. The program succeeded in increasing
enrollments rate significantly, but there is no evidence that it improved the quality of edu-
cation. Moreover, it has been criticized for reducing the quality of public-school education.
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2.3 Data
The data used in this paper come from the most recent Turkish Demographic and Health
Survey (TDHS (2013)). This nationally representative sample provides several characteristics
of respondents. According to the survey, almost half of the women in the survey were less
than 30 years of age; 68 percent were married; over half of women graduated at least from
junior high school; one-third of women have had at least high school degree; finally, 35% of
the females had been in employment during 12 month period. Fertility behavior: the fertility
rate peaks at the 25-29 age group; fertility is low level in the West and Central regions, but
the East is still well above three children. Fertility preferences: 57% of currently married
females do not want to have more child or are already sterilized; also, 18% of the females
want to wait at least two years for another child; the mean of the ideal number of desired
children is 2.9; if they could have prevented unwanted births, total fertility rate would be 1.9
children per female and fertility rate would be 0.4 children fewer than actual. Family planning
use: almost all women in the survey had heard one modern contraceptive method; 92% of
currently married women have used a family planning method in their life; 74% of women
are currently using a contraceptive method with 47% using modern and 26% depending on
traditional methods; finally, 84% of currently married women in the 35-39 age group are
using any method. Care during pregnancy: 97% of mothers received antenatal care during
the pregnancy; also, 95% of them had an examination by a doctor; 89% of the mothers had
more than four visits. Delivery care and postnatal care: 97% of all births were delivered at
a health facility; also, 97% of the births delivered with the assistance of a doctor or trained
health personnel; 70% of postnatal care was examined by a doctor. Furthermore, the data
includes more information about induced abortion, child mortality, child health, nutrition
indicators for children and women, and women’s status.
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2.3.1 Dependent Variables
Pregnancy Behavior Measures
For pregnancy behavior measures, I used the antenatal visit as a measure of maternal health.
Also, child anthropometric measurement, birth weight, are used as a measure of child health.
Furthermore, I used examination by trained medical personnel as dichotomous measures of
maternal health. The first dependent variable is the antenatal visit that individuals made
between 0 (not any visits) and 50 times. Birth weight, as the second dependent variable, is
the birth weight of the child between 500 grams and 6000 grams. The last two dependent
variables, as measurements of whether individuals were examined by professional or non-
professional. The first one compares the number of the individuals who took an examination
from nurses or midwives. Second and the last one compares the number of the individuals
who got an examination from professionals (doctors & nurses) or non-professionals (mid-
wives).
Reproductive Preference Measures
I defined reproductive preference measures by estimating contraceptive usage, number of
desired children, and preference of child gender. Contraceptive usage is a binary variable
whether the variable indicates individuals have used any contraceptive method or not in
their lifetime. The number of desired children is a continuous variable between 1 and 10.
The last two dependent variables are created by subtracting the women’s ideal number of
girls from the women’s ideal number of boys. So, they are measurements of child gender who
the women want to have. The first one measures that individuals want to have at least one
child and what gender they desire the child/children to be. The last one is a measurement
that individuals want to have only one child and what gender they desire the child to be.
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2.3.2 Control Variables
I use “birth-month” as a fixed effect to control the difference between birth months of individ-
uals and school starting month. I also include ”26 regions” as a region fixed effect at the time
of the survey to control for unobservable geographical effects, such as health care service and
social, cultural factors at places where the individual lives. I use ”partner/husband’s level
of education” that may have an effect on child health. Also, I include ”individuals’ fathers’
level of education” that have indirect effect on individuals’ education. I use ”parental blood
relationship” as a binary variable to account whether there is any blood relation between
women’s mothers and women’s fathers. Furthermore, I include ”partner’s parental blood
relationship” in the regression as a binary variable to account whether there is any blood re-
lation between partner’s mothers and partner’s fathers. Since, the blood relationship might
affect maternal health and child health.
On the other hand, I exclude the number of previous births and age of marriage that
are likely to be endogenously determined by individuals’ education but excluding previous
births does not any significant impact on the effects of individuals’ schooling on maternal
health care and child health. Also, Father’s education is correlated with mother’s education
(Chou et al. (2010)). That is why I exclude individuals’ mothers’ education. Moreover, the
mother’s education is likely to have a direct effect on an individual’s education. This may
cause an endogenous effect in the regression.
2.3.3 Sample Selection
The empirical analysis relies on the Turkish Demographic and Health Survey (TDHS (2013)).
It is the latest version of TDHS. This nationally representative survey covers a sample of
9,746 women, 7,219 of which are ever-married women between 15 and 49 age. I use a sample
of the latest birth of ever-married women inside of all women in the survey since childbearing
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out of wedlock is uncommon in Turkey. Also, the age group seems too broad to get more
precise results. However, the analysis occurs around 26 years old because of the cut-off point
(January-1987, 26 years old). After using the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2009) procedure
for the optimal bandwidth, the sample should consist of mostly between 21 and 31 age
range. Therefore, the optimal bandwidths rely on under sixty (60 as months, and 5 as
years). Thus, the optimal bandwidth determines the age group of the analysis and get rid
of sample selection bias.
2.4 Empirical Strategy
In 1997, the compulsory schooling law increased 5 years of mandatory schooling to 8 years of
mandatory education. The law combined the new mandatory schooling years with school-age
that individuals born after January 1987 must complete eight years of schooling. In contrast,
individuals born before January 1987 could drop out the school after five years of education.
This breakpoint allows me to use a Regression Discontinuity (RD) design to estimate the
causal effect of schooling on reproductive health behavior, as explained in further detail in
the previous section. Furthermore, the empirical strategy relies on a comparison of cohorts
born one month apart (just after or before the discontinuity). This shows that as long as the
treatment group and the control group are close to the discontinuity, the assumption does
not exhibit any systematic differences other than being increased to the year of schooling
by the compulsory schooling law. This treatment assignment provides that is as good as a
random assignment of the years of education (Imbens and Lemieux (2008)). In other words,
the other variables related to these outcomes are likely to remain balanced and continuous
either side of the cut-off point.
As previous research (Oreopoulos (2006), Clark and Royer (2013), Gulesci and Meyersson
(2015), Erten and Keskin (2020)), I use an RD design with the discontinuity in the birth
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date. Also, I exploit this discontinuity as an instrument for the year of education. I formulate
the statistical relationship between the law and all of the outcome variables of interest by
providing reduced-form estimates (sharp RD) and two-stage least-squares estimates (fuzzy
RD). The following is a basic RD form:
Yi = α + βti + f(xi) + εi, (2.1)
∀xi ∈ (c− h, c+ h)
Where yi is the dependent variables for reproductive health behavior measures, namely
antenatal visits, birth weight, an examination from a professional / a non-professional, con-
traceptive usage, number of desired children, gender preference of children. ti is the treatment
status, which takes value one if individuals born on or after January 01, 1987, and zero oth-
erwise. xi is the forcing variable which is normalized to zero at the cut-off point. f(xi) is the
control function, which is a continuous n-order polynomial in the forcing variable on each
side of the cut-off point (c). h is the bandwidth, which is estimated by using the Imbens
and Kalyanaraman (2009) procedure around the cut-off point. I use local linear regressions
in the RD estimations (Imbens and Lemieux (2008), Hahn et al. (2001)). As Lee and Card
(2008), I cluster the standard error at month-year of the birth level to regulate for specifica-
tion error in the forcing variable. Furthermore, I use the following control variables in all of
the estimations: fixed effects for the month of birth, as well as region fixed effects, partner’s
level of education, father’s level of education, a binary variable for parent blood relationship,
and a binary variable for partner’s parents blood relationship.
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2.5 Results
2.5.1 Pregnancy Behavior Outcomes
Using TDHS (2013), Table 2.2 reports the sharp RD treatment effect on pregnancy behavior
for ever-married women. In the third row, the mean of dependent indicates outcomes mean
for the whole sample. All estimation outcomes include the covariates; month-of-birth fixed
effect; region fixed effect; partner’s level of education; father’s level of education; a dummy
variable indicates whether an individual’s parents have blood relationship each other; and a
binary variable indicates whether partner’s/husband’s parents have blood relationship each
other. In Table 2.2, all results are based on the local linear specification with optimal
bandwidth (Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2009)) procedure.
The first column of Table 2.2 presents an estimate of the RD treatment effect on antenatal
visits of individuals who had given birth during the five years preceding the survey. So,
column 1 indicates an RD estimate of 2.036 visits, which is highly statistically significant for
the treatment effect on antenatal visits. This effect corresponds to a 22-percentage relative to
the mean. The linear RD result in column 2 shows there is not any statistically significant
effect on the birth weight of children who were born during the five years preceding the
survey. In the third column of Table 2.2 presents estimates of the RD treatment effect on
whether individuals had an examination after delivery from a doctor or a nurse. It is a binary
variable that takes value one if individuals had an examination from a doctor, otherwise zero
(from a nurse). The linear RD result indicates that there is a statistically significant effect
of 11 ppt (or 15 percentage relatives to the mean) at 5 percent level on individuals who had
examination after delivery from a doctor. In column 4, I use a binary variable to estimate
treatment effect on whether individuals had an examination after birth from a professional
as a doctor / a nurse or from a non-professional, as Midwife. It takes value one if individuals
had an examination from a professional (a doctor/a nurse), otherwise zero (a midwife). So,
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Column 4 indicates an RD estimate of 7.1 ppt, which is statistically significant at 5 percent
level for treatment effect on whether individuals had an examination after delivery from a
professional. This effect corresponds to an 8-percentage relative to the mean. As I report, the
reduced-form (sharp RD) and the IV estimates (fuzzy RD) are mostly the same (Table 2.4).
I also report OLS estimates (Table 2.6), all of these estimates for comparison. Therefore, I
focus on reduced-form regression using a local linear method in this study.
2.5.2 Reproductive Preference Outcomes
In this section, I test whether the compulsory schooling law affected outcomes related to
individuals’ reproductivity preference in Turkey. Table 2.3 reports reduced-from estimations
with optimal bandwidth procedure on reproductivity preference for ever-married women. All
estimation results include control variables, as I mentioned in the previous section. The first
column of Table 2.3 presents an estimate of the RD treatment effect on contraceptive usage.
It is a binary variable that takes value one if individuals use any contraceptive method in
their lifetime, otherwise zero. The linear RD result indicates that there is a statistically
significant effect of 4.6 ppt (or 5 percentage relatives to the mean) at 10 percent level on
contraceptive usage. This implies that the additional year of education caused by the law
affected individuals’ reproductivity preference as they do not want to have a child or postpone
to a later time. Column 2 shows an RD estimate of -0.3 children which is highly statistically
significant for the treatment effect on the number of desired children. This effect corresponds
to roughly 19 percent decrease relatives to the mean preference to have a child. The last two
columns show the results of the preference of child gender. The first estimation of preference
of children gender in column 3 is the preference of individuals who want to have at least
one child. It shows that there is no statistically significant effect of the additional year of
schooling by law on the preference of child gender. The last column indicates an estimate of
the RD treatment effect on whether individuals, who want to have only one child, prefer to
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have a boy or a girl. Again, there is no statistically significant effect of compulsory schooling
law on the preference of child gender with the restriction.
To sum up, the additional year of education by the reform increases contraceptive usage
and decrease the number of desired children. However, the law does not make any significant
change in the preference of child gender. Again, the reduced-form (sharp RD) and the
IV estimates (fuzzy RD) are mostly the same (Table 2.5). I also report OLS estimates
(Table 2.7), all of these estimates for comparison.
2.6 Discussion
In this paper, I estimate the effect of compulsory schooling law, which increases mandatory
schooling from 5 to 8 years, on reproductive health behavior by using a natural experiment,
the Turkish Demographic and Health Survey 2013 (TDHS (2013)). The law became effective
in the 1997-98 school year, which means if a student graduated from a primary school
in 1997, she/he could drop out. Also, the law implies that a child when she/he turns
six years old should attend a primary school in September of the year, which means if a
child was born before January 1987, she/he could drop out. Thus, the natural experiment
allows me to find out the causal effect of the education reform on pregnancy behaviors, and
on preference for reproductivity by implementing Regression Discontinuity (RD) design. I
divide the reproductive health behavior two-part as pregnancy behaviors and preferences
for reproductivity. The pregnancy behaviors consist of the number of antenatal visits, birth
weight, an examination from a professional/a non-professional. Also, I determine preferences
for reproductivity as contraceptive usage, the number of desired children, preference of child
gender (boy vs. girl).
I find that the reform led to the increasing enrollment rate of junior high school / high
school by increasing year of schooling for females (Table B.1). This increase had significant
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positive effects on pregnancy behaviors, namely the number of antenatal visits, an exam-
ination from a professional, and on preference for reproductivity as contraceptive usage.
Moreover, it had a significant adverse effect on the number of desired children as reproduc-
tivity for preference. On the other hand, there is no significant effect of more education on
birth weight, and on the preference of child gender. As Grossman (2006) mentioned, more
educated parents care about healthy children, not their gender.
The findings reveal that the reform had no significant effect on pregnancy behavior, and
on preference for reproductivity (except the number of desired children) by females living
in rural areas. On the other hand, I find a more significant impact of an additional year
of schooling at some part of the estimations by women who live in urban areas (Table B.2,
Table B.3, Table B.4 and Table B.5). This is likely linked; there were not enough facilities
as hospitals, polyclinics, health centers, and pharmacies in rural areas.
Overall, the empirical analysis indicates that the expansion of compulsory schooling from
5 years to 8 years had significant impacts on pregnancy behaviors, and on preference for
reproductivity. The limitation that women who live in rural areas, could not reach health
facilities easy and efficiently makes presumably heterogeneity difference across rural and
urban. However, the result indicates that the reform had a more significant impact on the
number of desired children for women who live in rural areas.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
Variable Observation Mean Std. Dev.
Pregnancy Behavior & Outcome
Antenatal Visit 1544 9.702 5.985
Birth Weight 1482 3191.086 640.025
Who Exam Individuals After Delivery
(Nurse vs Midwife/Others)
829 0.778 0.416




Contraceptive Usage 2279 0.890 0.313
Number of Desired Children 1335 1.644 0.878
Ideal Number of Boys Vs Girls Without
Individuals Do Not Want Any Child
1457 -0.005 0.631
Ideal Number of Boys Vs Girls Without
Individuals Want Only a Child (Boy or Girl)
728 -0.040 0.644
Covariates
Birth Month 2280 6.101 3.499
26 Region Where They are Living 2280 14.238 7.749
Partner’s Level of Education 2208 13.122 1.95
Father’s Level of Education 2204 1.225 0.974
Parents Blood Related 2279 0.296 0.457
Partner’s Parents Blood Related 2134 0.246 0.431
*Tables are created by bandwidth h=60.
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Table 2.2: Pregnancy Behaviors & Outcome
-Sharp RD-
(1) (2) (3) (4)












Treatment 2.036*** 11.183 0.113** 0.071**
[0.691] [76.430] [0.047] [0.035]
Mean of Dependent 9.5 3193 0.778 0.869
Observations 932 1,268 1,029 1,340
Note: Table shows some Linear RD (reduced form) results with optimal bandwidth that is effect of Com-
pulsory School Law on Pregnancy Behaviors for ever-married women. I use six control/covariate variables.
These are birth month (as fixed effect), region26 (where they live at), partner’s/husband’s level of education,
father’s level of education, parental blood relationship, and partner’s/husband’s parental blood relationship.
Each column has own optimal bandwidth h. Means are obtained from the full sample of the data.
Furthermore, Column 1 shows Antenatal Visits that is a continues variable between 0 and 50 visits. Birth
weight, as the second dependent variable, is the birth weight of the child between 500 grams and 6000
grams. The last two columns, as measurements of whether individuals were examined by professional or
non-professional. The first one compares the number of the individuals who took an examination from nurses
or midwives. Second and the last one compares the number of the individuals who got an examination from
professionals (doctors & nurses) or non-professionals (midwives).
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Table 2.3: Reproductive Preference
-Sharp RD-
(1) (2) (3) (4)











Treatment 0.046* -0.309*** 0.034 -0.286
[0.024] [0.099] [0.051] [0.276]
Mean of Dependent 0.903 1.621 0.009 -0.035
Observations 2,081 746 2,384 142
Note: Table shows some Linear RD (reduced form) results with optimal bandwidth that is effect of Compul-
sory School Law on Reproductive Preference for ever-married women. I use six control/covariate variables.
These are birth month (as fixed effect), region26 (where they live at), partner’s/husband’s level of education,
father’s level of education, parental blood relationship, and partner’s/husband’s parental blood relationship.
Each column has own optimal bandwidth h. Means are obtained from the full sample of the data.
Furthermore, Column 1 shows that Contraceptive usage is a binary variable whether the variable indicates
individuals have used any contraceptive method or not in their lifetime. The number of desired children is a
continuous variable between 1 and 10. The last two columns are created by subtracting the women’s ideal
number of girls from the women’s ideal number of boys. So, they are measurements of child gender who
the women want to have. The first one measures that individuals want to have at least one child and what
gender they desire the child/children to be. The last one is a measurement that individuals want to have
only one child and what gender they desire the child to be.
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Table 2.4: Pregnancy Behaviors & Outcome
-Fuzzy RD-
(1) (2) (3) (4)












Years of Education 2.934** 15.556 0.138** 0.087**
[1.264] [103.686] [0.062] [0.044]
Mean of Dependent 9.5 3193 0.778 0.869
Observations 932 1,268 1,029 1,340
Note: Table shows some Linear RD (two-stage least-squares) results with optimal bandwidth that is effect
of Compulsory School Law on Pregnancy Behaviors for ever-married women. I use six control/covariate
variables. These are birth month (as fixed effect), region26 (where they live at), partner’s/husband’s level
of education, father’s level of education, parental blood relationship, and partner’s/husband’s parental blood
relationship. Each column has own optimal bandwidth h. Means are obtained from the full sample of the
data.
Furthermore, Column 1 shows Antenatal Visits that is a continues variable between 0 and 50 visits. Birth
weight, as the second dependent variable, is the birth weight of the child between 500 grams and 6000
grams. The last two columns, as measurements of whether individuals were examined by professional or
non-professional. The first one compares the number of the individuals who took an examination from nurses
or midwives. Second and the last one compares the number of the individuals who got an examination from
professionals (doctors & nurses) or non-professionals (midwives).
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Table 2.5: Reproductive Preference
-Fuzzy RD-
(1) (2) (3) (4)











Years of Education 0.063* -0.418*** 0.050 0.530
[0.035] [0.200] [0.074] [0.794]
Mean of Dependent 0.903 1.621 0.009 -0.035
Observations 2,080 746 2,383 142
Note: Table shows some Linear RD (two-stage least-squares) results with optimal bandwidth that is effect
of Compulsory School Law on Reproductive Preference for ever-married women. I use six control/covariate
variables. These are birth month (as fixed effect), region26 (where they live at), partner’s/husband’s level
of education, father’s level of education, parental blood relationship, and partner’s/husband’s parental blood
relationship. Each column has own optimal bandwidth h. Means are obtained from the full sample of the
data.
Furthermore, Column 1 shows that Contraceptive usage is a binary variable whether the variable indicates
individuals have used any contraceptive method or not in their lifetime. The number of desired children is a
continuous variable between 1 and 10. The last two columns are created by subtracting the women’s ideal
number of girls from the women’s ideal number of boys. So, they are measurements of child gender who
the women want to have. The first one measures that individuals want to have at least one child and what
gender they desire the child/children to be. The last one is a measurement that individuals want to have
only one child and what gender they desire the child to be.
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Table 2.6: Pregnancy Behaviors & Outcome
-OLS-












Years of Education 0.248*** 2.885 0.012** 0.011***
[0.085] [7.787] [0.005] [0.004]
Mean of Dependent 9.5 3193 0.778 0.869
Observations 932 1,268 1,029 1,340
Note: Table shows some OLS results with optimal bandwidth that is effect of Compulsory School Law
on Pregnancy Behaviors for ever-married women. I use six control/covariate variables. These are birth
month (as fixed effect), region26 (where they live at), partner’s/husband’s level of education, father’s level
of education, parental blood relationship, and partner’s/husband’s parental blood relationship. Each column
has own optimal bandwidth h. Means are obtained from the full sample of the data.
Furthermore, Column 1 shows Antenatal Visits that is a continues variable between 0 and 50 visits. Birth
weight, as the second dependent variable, is the birth weight of the child between 500 grams and 6000
grams. The last two columns, as measurements of whether individuals were examined by professional or
non-professional. The first one compares the number of the individuals who took an examination from nurses
or midwives. Second and the last one compares the number of the individuals who got an examination from
professionals (doctors & nurses) or non-professionals (midwives).
CHAPTER 2. TWO 61
Table 2.7: Reproductive Preference
-OLS-











Years of Education 0.001 0.016 -0.007 0.035
[0.002] [0.015] [0.005] [0.023]
Mean of Dependent 0.903 1.621 0.009 -0.035
Observations 2,080 746 2,383 142
Note: Table shows some OLS results with optimal bandwidth that is effect of Compulsory School Law
on Pregnancy Behaviors for ever-married women. I use six control/covariate variables. These are birth
month (as fixed effect), region26 (where they live at), partner’s/husband’s level of education, father’s level
of education, parental blood relationship, and partner’s/husband’s parental blood relationship. Each column
has own optimal bandwidth h. Means are obtained from the full sample of the data.
Furthermore, Column 1 shows that Contraceptive usage is a binary variable whether the variable indicates
individuals have used any contraceptive method or not in their lifetime. The number of desired children is a
continuous variable between 1 and 10. The last two columns are created by subtracting the women’s ideal
number of girls from the women’s ideal number of boys. So, they are measurements of child gender who
the women want to have. The first one measures that individuals want to have at least one child and what
gender they desire the child/children to be. The last one is a measurement that individuals want to have
only one child and what gender they desire the child to be.
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Figure 2.1: Number of Student in 8-year Primary Education
Figure 2.2: The Gender Gap Ratio (8-year Primary Education)
Note: Table shows some Linear RD
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Figure 2.3: Antenatal Visits
Figure 2.4: Birth Weight
Note: Table shows some Linear RD Data are from the 2013 Turkish Demographic Health Survey. The
figures plot continuous variables that show number of Antenatal Visits (Figure 3) and Birth Weight (Figure
4) with respect to the individuals’ birth months. The vertical dashed line in each graph represents the
Cut-off point, 01-1987, is 0. It implied that individuals born after 01-1987 (right side of 0 at horizontal axe)
have to complete 8 years of schooling, whereas those born before 01-1987 (left side of 0 at horizontal axe)
do not have to complete 8 year of schooling. Gray dashed lines show 95 percent confidence intervals around
the mean level. All figures are created by using bandwidths between h=-60 to h=60.
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Figure 2.5: Who Examined Individuals After Delivery (Nurse vs Midwife/Other)
Figure 2.6: Who Examined Individuals After Delivery (Professional vs Non-Professional)
Note: Table shows some Linear RD Data are from the 2013 Turkish Demographic Health Survey. The
figures plot a dummy variable equals to one if the respondent were examined (Figure 5)by Nurse (Figure
6)by Professional (Doctor & Nurses) and zero otherwise (Midwives/Non-Professional). The vertical dashed
line in each graph represents the Cut-off point, 01-1987, is 0. It implied that individuals born after 01-1987
(right side of 0 at horizontal axe) have to complete 8 years of schooling, whereas those born before 01-1987
(left side of 0 at horizontal axe) do not have to complete 8 year of schooling. Gray dashed lines show 95
percent confidence intervals around the mean level. All figures are created by using bandwidths between
h=-60 to h=60.
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Figure 2.7: Contraceptive Usage
Figure 2.8: Number of Desired Children
Note: Data are from the 2013 Turkish Demographic Health Survey. The figure 7 plots a dummy variable
equals to one if individuals used any contraceptive method and zero otherwise. Also, the figure 8 plots how
many number of children individuals desired with respect to their birth months. The vertical dashed line in
each graph represents the Cut-off point, 01-1987, is 0. It implied that individuals born after 01-1987 (right
side of 0 at horizontal axe) have to complete 8 years of schooling, whereas those born before 01-1987 (left
side of 0 at horizontal axe) do not have to complete 8 year of schooling. Gray dashed lines show 95 percent
confidence intervals around the mean level. All figures are created by using bandwidths between h=-60 to
h=60.
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Figure 2.9: Ideal Number of Boys vs Girls*
Figure 2.10: Ideal Number of Boys vs Girls**
Note: Table shows some Linear RD Data are from the 2013 Turkish Demographic Health Survey. The
figures plot a dummy variable equals to one if the respondent wants child/children who they are boys (Figure
9) at least one child, (Figure 10) only one child and zero otherwise. The vertical dashed line in each graph
represents the Cut-off point, 01-1987, is 0. It implied that individuals born after 01-1987 (right side of 0 at
horizontal axe) have to complete 8 years of schooling, whereas those born before 01-1987 (left side of 0 at
horizontal axe) do not have to complete 8 year of schooling. Gray dashed lines show 95 percent confidence
intervals around the mean level. All figures are created by using bandwidths between h=-60 to h=60.
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Figure 2.11: Balanced Covariates
(a) Partner’s Level of Education (b) Father’s Level of Education
(c) Parent’s Blood Relationship (d) Partner’s Parent Blood Relationship
Note: Data is from 2013 TDHS. Figures show pre-determined covariates in monthly bins against the forcing
variables 5 years within the threshold of being born in January 1987. A test of the null hypothesis that the
discontinuity jumps in all graphs are jointly zero. 95 percent confidence intervals are plotted in dash lines
around the mean level. The vertical line in each graph represents the Cut-off point between 01-1987 is 0.
It implied that individuals born after 01-1987 (right side of 0 at horizontal axe) have to complete 8 years
of schooling, whereas those born before 01-1987 (left side of 0 at horizontal axe) do not have to complete 8
year of schooling.
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Figure 2.12: McCrary Density Test
Note: Data are from the 2013 TDHS. The graph shows the results of the McCrary test of whether there is
a discontinuity in the density of the forcing variable, the month of birth.
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Table A.1: Individuals (Immediate Impact)
(1) (2)








Mean of Dependent 0.524 7.338
Observations 6,881 4,760
Note: Table shows some Linear RD results with optimal bandwidth that is effect of Compulsory School Law
on Jr.High School enrollment and Years od Education for all women. We use five control/covariate variables.
These are birth month (as fixed effect), region26 childhood (where they lived until 12 years old), residence
(whether they are currently living in rural/urban), wealth (Poorest, Poorer, Middle, Richer, Richest), mother
tongue (Turkish, Kurdish, Arabic, other). Each column has own optimal bandwidth h. Means are obtained
from the full sample of the data.
Furthermore, Column 1 shows Junior High School that is a binary variable. Junior High School=1 If an
individual has attended a junior high school at least or at least 8 years of schooling. Otherwise, it is 0.
Moreover, Column 2 indicates Years of Education that how many years individual has education is between
0 and 21 years.
Table A.1 represents results of the effect of the Law on individuals’ junior higher educational
attainment of women and years of individuals’ education attainment in Turkey. We call
immediate impact on education attainment of women because the law increases mandatory
education 5 years to 8 years. That is why immediate impact occurs at junior high school
attainment (8 years of schooling). Linear RD result with optimal bandwidth h=141 at
column (1) shows there is a high statistically significant effect of 16 ppt (or 30 percentage
relatives to the mean) on junior high school attainment. Moreover, result of the column (2)
indicates that the reform has also a high statistically significant effect of 95.6 ppt on years
of educational attainment at optimal bandwidth h=99. So, junior high educational level
attainment of women is affected positively by the Compulsory Schooling Law in Turkey.
Furthermore, Figure A.1 (a & b) show some evidence of positive jumps at discontinuity that
support the results in Table A.1.
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Table A.2: Individuals vs Parents (Immediate Impact)
(1) (2)








Mean of Dependent 0.446 0.338
Observations 4,509 4,245
Note: Table shows some Linear RD results with optimal bandwidth that is effect of Compulsory School Law
on Education Level Difference Between Individual and Her Parents. Table indicates immediate impact on
education level difference between them. We use five control/covariate variables. These are birth month (as
fixed effect), region26 childhood (where they lived until 12 years old), residence (whether they are currently
living in rural/urban), wealth (Poorest, Poorer, Middle, Richer, Richest), mother tongue (Turkish, Kurdish,
Arabic, other). Each column has own optimal bandwidth h. Means are obtained from the full sample of the
data.
Furthermore, Column 1 shows Junior High School (individual vs Mother) that is a binary variable. Junior
High School=1 If an individual has attended a junior high school at least or at least 8 years of schooling
but her mother has never attended any junior high school. Otherwise, it is 0. Moreover, Column 2 indicates
Junior High School (individual vs Father) that is also a binary variable. Junior High School=1 If an individual
has attended a junior high school at least or at least 8 years of schooling but her father has never attended
any junior high school. Otherwise, it is 0.
Table A.2 represents results of the effect of the Law on intergenerational mobility in terms
of junior higher educational attainment difference between individuals and their parents in
Turkey. We also call immediate impact on intergenerational education mobility because the
law increases mandatory education 5 years to 8 years. That is why immediate impact occurs
at junior high school attainment (8 years of schooling). Linear RD result with optimal
bandwidth h=96 at column (1) shows there is a high statistically significant effect of 12 ppt
(or 27 percentage relatives to the mean) on intergeneration educational mobility in terms
of difference between individuals and their mothers. Furthermore, result of the column (2)
indicates that the reform has also a statistically significant effect of 7.2 ppt (or 22 percentage
relatives to the mean) on intergeneration educational mobility in terms of difference between
individuals and their fathers at optimal bandwidth h=91. So, intergenerational mobility
in terms of junior higher educational attainment difference between individuals and their
parents is affected positively by the Compulsory Schooling Law in Turkey. Furthermore,
Figure A.1 (c & d) show some evidence of positive jumps at discontinuity that support the
results in Table A.2.
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Figure A.1: Immediate Impact
(a) Jr.High School Enrollment(Individual) (b) Years of Education
(c) Jr.High School Difference Between Individual
and Her Mother
(d) Jr.High School Difference Between Individual
and Her Father
Note: Data are from the 2013 Turkish Demographic Health Survey. The figures plot a dummy variable
equals to one if the respondent enrolls respective school level and zero otherwise. The vertical dashed line in
each graph represents the Cut-off point, 01-1987, is 0. It implied that individuals born after 01-1987 (right
side of 0 at horizontal axe) have to complete 8 years of schooling, whereas those born before 01-1987 (left
side of 0 at horizontal axe) do not have to complete 8 year of schooling. Gray dashed lines show 95 percent
confidence intervals around the mean level. All figures are created by using bandwidths between h=-100 to
h=100.
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Table A.3: Impacts of Compulsory Schooling Law on Women’s
Labor Market Outcomes -Fuzzy RD-
Panel A: Current Labor Market Outcomes
(1) (2) (3)









Treatment 0.013 0.073** 0.130***
[0.031] [0.034] [0.040]
Mean of Dependent 0.326 0.636 0.522
Observations 1,666 1,402 746
Panel B: Lifetime Labor Market Outcomes
(1) (2) (3)









Treatment 0.067** 0.023 0.083***
[0.028] [0.024] [0.032]
Mean of Dependent 0.458 0.747 0.458
Observations 4,438 2,208 2,124
Note: Table shows some Linear RD (two-stage least-squares) results with optimal bandwidth that is effect of
Compulsory School Law on Current labor market outcomes in Panel A and Lifetime labor market outcomes
in Panel B for all individuals. We use five control/covariate variables. These are birth month (as fixed
effect), region26 childhood (where they lived until 12 years old), residence (whether they are currently living
in rural/urban), wealth (Poorest, Poorer, Middle, Richer, Richest), mother tongue (Turkish, Kurdish, Arabic,
other). Each column has own optimal bandwidth h. Means are obtained from the full sample of the data.
Furthermore, Panel A shows Currently Working is a binary variable. Currently Working=1 if an individual
currently has a job zero otherwise. Moreover, Column 2 indicates that Non-Paid Work vs Paid Work is also
binary variable which equals to 1 if an individual has currently Paid Job. Column 3 shows Job Offers Social
Security is also binary variable that equals to one if an individual currently has a job which offers social
security zero otherwise.
Moreover, Panel B shows Ever Worked is a binary variable. Ever Worked=1 if an individual has ever a
job in her lifetime zero otherwise. Moreover, Column 2 indicates that Non-Paid Work vs Paid Work is also
binary variable which equals to 1 if an individual has ever Paid Job. Column 3 shows Job Offers Social
Security is also binary variable that equals one if an individual has ever a job which offers social security
zero otherwise.
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Table A.4: The Impacts of Compulsory Schooling Law on Women’s Education














Panel A: Years of Education
Treatment 0.956*** 0.954*** 0.695*** 1.252***
[0.200] [0.200] [0.227] [0.167]
Bandwidth 99 99 74 149
Observations 4,760 4,760 3,571 7,040
Panel B: Junior High School
Treatment 0.156*** 0.155*** 0.140*** 0.167***
[0.019] [0.019] [0.023] [0.017]
Bandwidth 141 141 106 212
Observations 6,881 6,881 5,085 8,399
Panel C: High School
Treatment 0.053** 0.053** 0.049* 0.054***
[0.025] [0.025] [0.028] [0.021]
Bandwidth 79 79 59 119
Observations 3,823 3,823 2,836 5,778
Panel D: College/Above
Treatment 0.034 0.033 0.013 0.062***
[0.025] [0.024] [0.029] [0.020]
Bandwidth 60 60 45 90
Observations 2,836 2,836 2,128 4,280
Notes: Data are from the 2013 Turkish Demographic and Health Survey. All results are reported for the full
sample of women. Columns 1, 3 and 4 report local RD regressions with linear polynomials in the month-year
of birth using the static bandwidth h, 0.75 h and 1.5 h, respectively. Moreover, Columns 2 reports local RD
regressions with quadratic polynomials in the month-year of birth using the static bandwidth, which is the
optimal bandwidth estimated by using the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2009) algorithm, respectively. All
specifications control are birth month (as fixed effect), region26 childhood (where they lived until 12 years
old), residence (whether they are currently living in rural/urban), wealth (Poorest, Poorer, Middle, Richer,
Richest), mother tongue (Turkish, Kurdish, Arabic, other). Each column has own optimal bandwidth h.
Means are obtained from the full sample of the data. Standard errors are clustered at the month-year cohort
level. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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Table A.5: Impact of Compulsory Schooling Law on Women’s Intergenerational Mobility
with Respect to Mothers’ Education














Panel A: Junior High School
Treatment 0.119*** 0.118*** 0.113*** 0.146***
[0.027] [0.027] [0.030] [0.023]
Bandwidth 96 96 72 144
Observations 4,509 4,509 3,392 6,875
Panel B: High School
Treatment 0.060** 0.059** 0.044 0.038**
[0.024] [0.024] [0.027] [0.019]
Bandwidth 103 103 77 154
Observations 4,936 4,936 3,699 7,146
Panel C: College/Above
Treatment 0.029 0.028 0.002 0.056***
[0.025] [0.025] [0.028] [0.021]
Bandwidth 62 62 46 93
Observations 2,962 2,962 2,207 4,430
Notes: Data are from the 2013 Turkish Demographic and Health Survey. All results are reported for the full
sample of women. Columns 1, 3 and 4 report local RD regressions with linear polynomials in the month-year
of birth using the static bandwidth h, 0.75 h and 1.5 h, respectively. Moreover, Columns 2 reports local RD
regressions with quadratic polynomials in the month-year of birth using the static bandwidth, which is the
optimal bandwidth estimated by using the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2009) algorithm, respectively. All
specifications control are birth month (as fixed effect), region26 childhood (where they lived until 12 years
old), residence (whether they are currently living in rural/urban), wealth (Poorest, Poorer, Middle, Richer,
Richest), mother tongue (Turkish, Kurdish, Arabic, other). Each column has own optimal bandwidth h.
Means are obtained from the full sample of the data. Standard errors are clustered at the month-year cohort
level. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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Table A.6: Impact of Compulsory Schooling Law on Women’s Intergenerational Mobility
with Respect to Fathers’ Education














Panel A: Junior High School
Treatment 0.072*** 0.071*** 0.029 0.108***
[0.026] [0.026] [0.027] [0.021]
Bandwidth 91 91 68 136
Observations 4,245 4,245 3,181 6,485
Panel B: High School
Treatment 0.033* 0.031 0.052** 0.030*
[0.020] [0.020] [0.022] [0.018]
Bandwidth 150 150 112 224
Observations 6,853 6,853 5,346 8,359
Panel C: College/Above
Treatment 0.024 0.023 0.011 0.061***
[0.027] [0.027] [0.031] [0.022]
Bandwidth 64 64 48 96
Observations 2,945 2,945 2,195 4,414
Notes: Data are from the 2013 Turkish Demographic and Health Survey. All results are reported for the full
sample of women. Columns 1, 3 and 4 report local RD regressions with linear polynomials in the month-year
of birth using the static bandwidth h, 0.75 h and 1.5 h, respectively. Moreover, Columns 2 reports local RD
regressions with quadratic polynomials in the month-year of birth using the static bandwidth, which is the
optimal bandwidth estimated by using the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2009) algorithm, respectively. All
specifications control are birth month (as fixed effect), region26 childhood (where they lived until 12 years
old), residence (whether they are currently living in rural/urban), wealth (Poorest, Poorer, Middle, Richer,
Richest), mother tongue (Turkish, Kurdish, Arabic, other). Each column has own optimal bandwidth h.
Means are obtained from the full sample of the data. Standard errors are clustered at the month-year cohort
level. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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Table A.7: Heterogeneity in The Impacts of Compulsory Schooling Law on
Women’s Education
Individual’s Education














Panel A: Jr. High School-RURAL
Treatment 0.207*** 0.206*** 0.191*** 0.236***
[0.032] [0.032] [0.037] [0.029]
Bandwidth 123 123 92 184
Observations 2,170 2,170 1,589 2,958
Panel B: Jr. High School-URBAN
Treatment 0.107*** 0.106*** 0.106*** 0.115***
[0.023] [0.023] [0.027] [0.021]
Bandwidth 136 136 102 204
Observations 4,253 4,253 3,170 5,118
Conditional on Mother’s Education
Panel C: Jr. High School-RURAL
Treatment 0.156*** 0.155*** 0.142*** 0.204***
[0.038] [0.038] [0.045] [0.032]
Bandwidth 94 94 70 140
Observations 1,596 1,596 1,191 2,440
Panel D: Jr. High School-URBAN
Treatment 0.088*** 0.086*** 0.097*** 0.105***
[0.031] [0.031] [0.037] [0.027]
Bandwidth 113 113 85 170
Observations 3,480 3,480 2,567 4,682
Notes: Data are from the 2013 Turkish Demographic and Health Survey. All results are reported for the full
sample of women. Columns 1, 3 and 4 report local RD regressions with linear polynomials in the month-year
of birth using the static bandwidth h, 0.75 h and 1.5 h, respectively. Moreover, Columns 2 reports local RD
regressions with quadratic polynomials in the month-year of birth using the static bandwidth, which is the
optimal bandwidth estimated by using the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2009) algorithm, respectively. All
specifications control are birth month (as fixed effect), region26 childhood (where they lived until 12 years
old), residence (whether they are currently living in rural/urban), wealth (Poorest, Poorer, Middle, Richer,
Richest), mother tongue (Turkish, Kurdish, Arabic, other). Each column has own optimal bandwidth h.
Means are obtained from the full sample of the data. Standard errors are clustered at the month-year cohort
level. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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Table A.8: Impacts of Compulsory Schooling Law on Women’s
Current Labor Market Outcomes














Panel A: Currently Working
Treatment 0.017 0.016 0.034 -0.010
[0.040] [0.040] [0.047] [0.034]
Bandwidth 77 77 58 116
Observations 1,667 1,667 1,279 2,344
Panel B: Non-Paid Work vs Paid Work
Treatment 0.098** 0.108** 0.107** 0.063
[0.042] [0.042] [0.046] [0.039]
Bandwidth 163 163 122 244
Observations 1,402 1,402 1,114 1,798
Panel C: Job Offers Social Security
Treatment 0.195*** 0.200*** 0.174** 0.166***
[0.060] [0.061] [0.071] [0.051]
Bandwidth 116 116 87 174
Observations 746 746 577 993
Notes: Data are from the 2013 Turkish Demographic and Health Survey. All results are reported for the full
sample of women. Columns 1, 3 and 4 report local RD regressions with linear polynomials in the month-year
of birth using the static bandwidth h, 0.75 h and 1.5 h, respectively. Moreover, Columns 2 reports local RD
regressions with quadratic polynomials in the month-year of birth using the static bandwidth, which is the
optimal bandwidth estimated by using the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2009) algorithm, respectively. All
specifications control are birth month (as fixed effect), region26 childhood (where they lived until 12 years
old), residence (whether they are currently living in rural/urban), wealth (Poorest, Poorer, Middle, Richer,
Richest), mother tongue (Turkish, Kurdish, Arabic, other). Each column has own optimal bandwidth h.
Means are obtained from the full sample of the data. Standard errors are clustered at the month-year cohort
level. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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Table A.9: Impacts of Compulsory Schooling Law on Women’s
Lifetime Labor Market Outcomes














Panel A: Ever Worked
Treatment 0.066*** 0.067*** 0.033 0.099***
[0.024] [0.024] [0.026] [0.021]
Bandwidth 103 103 77 154
Observations 4,439 4,439 3,375 6,419
Panel B: Non-Paid Work vs Paid Work
Treatment 0.026 0.027 0.032 0.060**
[0.027] [0.027] [0.031] [0.025]
Bandwidth 85 85 64 128
Observations 2,209 2,209 1,662 3,140
Panel C: Job Offers Social Security
Treatment 0.109** 0.112*** 0.100** 0.101***
[0.043] [0.043] [0.048] [0.037]
Bandwidth 103 103 77 154
Observations 2,125 2,125 1,668 2,804
Notes: Data are from the 2013 Turkish Demographic and Health Survey. All results are reported for the full
sample of women. Columns 1, 3 and 4 report local RD regressions with linear polynomials in the month-year
of birth using the static bandwidth h, 0.75 h and 1.5 h, respectively. Moreover, Columns 2 reports local RD
regressions with quadratic polynomials in the month-year of birth using the static bandwidth, which is the
optimal bandwidth estimated by using the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2009) algorithm, respectively. All
specifications control are birth month (as fixed effect), region26 childhood (where they lived until 12 years
old), residence (whether they are currently living in rural/urban), wealth (Poorest, Poorer, Middle, Richer,
Richest), mother tongue (Turkish, Kurdish, Arabic, other). Each column has own optimal bandwidth h.
Means are obtained from the full sample of the data. Standard errors are clustered at the month-year cohort
level. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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Table B.1: Individuals Education Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4)







Treatment 0.757*** 0.171*** 0.085*** -0.006
[0.178] [0.032] [0.026] [0.016]
Observations 2,702 2,324 3,180 3,950
Note: Table shows some Linear RD (reduced form) results with optimal bandwidth that is effect of Com-
pulsory School Law on Education Outcomes for ever-married women. I use six control/covariate variables.
These are birth month (as fixed effect), region26 (where they live at), partner’s/husband’s level of education,
father’s level of education, parental blood relationship, and partner’s/husband’s parental blood relationship.
Each column has own optimal bandwidth h.
Furthermore, Column 1 shows Years of Education that is a continues variable between 0 and 16 years. Junior
High School that is a binary variable. Junior High School=1 If an individual has attended a junior high
school at least or at least 8 years of schooling. Otherwise, it is 0. Column 3 shows High School that is
a binary variable. High School=1 If an individual has enrolled a high school at least or at least 11 years
of schooling. Otherwise, it is 0. Moreover, last column indicates College/Above that is a binary variable.
College/Above=1 If an individual has enrolled a college at least or more than a college as Master/PhD level
education. Otherwise, it is 0.
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Figure B.1: Individuals Education Outcomes
(a) Years of Education (b) Junior High School
(c) High School (d) College/Above
Note: Education Years are re-scaled as 0 if years of education are less and equal 5, 1 if years of education
is six, and so on. Also, Figure B.1 (b,c and d) plot a dummy variable equals to one if the respondent
enrolls respective school level and zero otherwise. The vertical line in each graph represents the Cut-off
point between 01-1987 is 0. It implied that individuals born after 01-1987 (right side of 0 at horizontal axis)
have to complete eight years of schooling. In contrast, those born before 01-1987 (left side of 0 at horizontal
axis) do not have to complete 8 years of education. Gray dashed lines show 95 percent confidence intervals
around the mean level. All figures are created by using bandwidths between h=-60 to h=60.
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Table B.2: Pregnancy Behaviors & Outcome
-Urban-
(1) (2) (3) (4)












Treatment 2.396*** -3.749 0.167*** 0.122***
[0.758] [88.773] [0.053] [0.037]
Observations 742 723 762 1,032
Note: Table shows some Linear RD (reduced form) results with optimal bandwidth that is effect of Com-
pulsory School Law on Pregnancy Behaviors for ever-married women who live at urban areas. I use
six control/covariate variables. These are birth month (as fixed effect), region26 (where they live at),
partner’s/husband’s level of education, father’s level of education, parental blood relationship, and part-
ner’s/husband’s parental blood relationship. Each column has own optimal bandwidth h.
Furthermore, Column 1 shows Antenatal Visits that is a continues variable between 0 and 50 visits. Birth
weight, as the second dependent variable, is the birth weight of the child between 500 grams and 6000
grams. The last two columns, as measurements of whether individuals were examined by professional or
non-professional. The first one compares the number of the individuals who took an examination from nurses
or midwives. Second and the last one compares the number of the individuals who got an examination from
professionals (doctors & nurses) or non-professionals (midwives).
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Table B.3: Reproductive Preference
-Urban-
(1) (2) (3) (4)











Treatment 0.044** -0.102 0.012 -0.066
[0.022] [0.104] [0.063] [0.293]
Observations 1,948 834 1,801 128
Note: Table shows some Linear RD (reduced form) results with optimal bandwidth that is effect of Com-
pulsory School Law on Reproductive Preference for ever-married women who live at urban areas. I use
six control/covariate variables. These are birth month (as fixed effect), region26 (where they live at),
partner’s/husband’s level of education, father’s level of education, parental blood relationship, and part-
ner’s/husband’s parental blood relationship. Each column has own optimal bandwidth h.
Furthermore, Column 1 shows that Contraceptive usage is a binary variable whether the variable indicates
individuals have used any contraceptive method or not in their lifetime. The number of desired children is a
continuous variable between 1 and 10. The last two columns are created by subtracting the women’s ideal
number of girls from the women’s ideal number of boys. So, they are measurements of child gender who
the women want to have. The first one measures that individuals want to have at least one child and what
gender they desire the child/children to be. The last one is a measurement that individuals want to have
only one child and what gender they desire the child to be.
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Table B.4: Pregnancy Behaviors & Outcome
-Rural-
(1) (2) (3) (4)












Treatment -0.077 -172.044 0.111 -0.058
[1.236] [150.437] [0.138] [0.078]
Observations 312 418 172 338
Note: Table shows some Linear RD (reduced form) results with optimal bandwidth that is effect of
Compulsory School Law on Pregnancy Behaviors for ever-married women who live at rural areas. I use
six control/covariate variables. These are birth month (as fixed effect), region26 (where they live at),
partner’s/husband’s level of education, father’s level of education, parental blood relationship, and part-
ner’s/husband’s parental blood relationship. Each column has own optimal bandwidth h.
Furthermore, Column 1 shows Antenatal Visits that is a continues variable between 0 and 50 visits. Birth
weight, as the second dependent variable, is the birth weight of the child between 500 grams and 6000
grams. The last two columns, as measurements of whether individuals were examined by professional or
non-professional. The first one compares the number of the individuals who took an examination from nurses
or midwives. Second and the last one compares the number of the individuals who got an examination from
professionals (doctors & nurses) or non-professionals (midwives).
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Table B.5: Reproductive Preference
-Rural-
(1) (2) (3) (4)











Treatment 0.041 -0.547** 0.053 -20.400
[[0.050] [0.254] [0.087] [.]
Observations 589 190 855 34
Note: Table shows some Linear RD (reduced form) results with optimal bandwidth that is effect of Com-
pulsory School Law on Reproductive Preference for ever-married women who live at rural areas. I use
six control/covariate variables. These are birth month (as fixed effect), region26 (where they live at),
partner’s/husband’s level of education, father’s level of education, parental blood relationship, and part-
ner’s/husband’s parental blood relationship. Each column has own optimal bandwidth h. Means are obtained
from the full sample of the data.
Furthermore, Column 1 shows that Contraceptive usage is a binary variable whether the variable indicates
individuals have used any contraceptive method or not in their lifetime. The number of desired children is a
continuous variable between 1 and 10. The last two columns are created by subtracting the women’s ideal
number of girls from the women’s ideal number of boys. So, they are measurements of child gender who
the women want to have. The first one measures that individuals want to have at least one child and what
gender they desire the child/children to be. The last one is a measurement that individuals want to have
only one child and what gender they desire the child to be.
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Table B.6: Pregnancy Behaviors & Outcome














Panel A: Antenatal Visits
Treatment 2.036*** 2.050*** 2.787*** 2.427***
[0.691] [0.701] [0.733] [0.589]
Bandwidth 39 39 29 58
Observations 932 932 740 1,308
Panel B: Birth Weight
Treatment 11.183 13.510 21.184 41.689
[76.430] [76.529] [87.857] [61.725]
Bandwidth 58 58 44 88
Observations 1,268 1,268 1,000 1,754
Panel C: Who Examining (Nurse vs. Midwife/Other)
Treatment 0.113** 0.115** 0.159*** 0.094**
[0.047] [0.047] [0.054] [0.043]
Bandwidth 92 92 69 138
Observations 1,029 1,029 827 1,237
Panel D: Who Examining (Professionals vs. Midwife)
Treatment 0.071** 0.073** 0.043 0.046
[0.035] [0.036] [0.036] [0.030]
Bandwidth 67 67 50 100
Observations 1,340 1,340 1,061 1,804
Notes: Data are from the 2013 Turkish Demographic and Health Survey. All results are reported for the full
sample of women. Columns 1, 3 and 4 report local RD regressions with linear polynomials in the month-year
of birth using the static bandwidth h, 0.75 h and 1.5 h, respectively. Moreover, Columns 2 reports local RD
regressions with quadratic polynomials in the month-year of birth using the static bandwidth, which is the
optimal bandwidth estimated by using the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2009) algorithm, respectively. All
specifications control are birth month (as fixed effect), region26 (where they live at), partner’s/husband’s
level of education, father’s level of education, parental blood relationship, and partner’s/husband’s parental
blood relationship. Standard errors are clustered at the month-year cohort level. ***, **, and * denote
significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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Table B.7: Reproductive Preference















Treatment 0.046* 0.048* 0.049** 0.023
[0.024] [0.025] [0.024] [0.019]
Bandwidth 64 64 48 96
Observations 2,081 2,081 1,576 2,974
Panel B: Number of Desired Children
Treatment -0.309*** -0.307*** -0.293*** -0.197**
[0.099] [0.100] [0.107] [0.086]
Bandwidth 37 37 28 56
Observations 746 746 571 1,074
Panel C: Boys vs Girls (without no child)
Treatment 0.034 0.039 0.012 -0.005
[0.051] [0.052] [0.057] [0.045]
Bandwidth 74 74 55 110
Observations 2,384 2,384 1,814 3,331
Panel D: Boys vs Girls (only one child)
Treatment -0.286 -0.274 -0.331 -0.119
[0.276] [0.273] [0.381] [0.235]
Bandwidth 70 70 52 104
Observations 142 142 110 203
Notes: Data are from the 2013 Turkish Demographic and Health Survey. All results are reported for the full
sample of women. Columns 1, 3 and 4 report local RD regressions with linear polynomials in the month-year
of birth using the static bandwidth h, 0.75 h and 1.5 h, respectively. Moreover, Columns 2 reports local RD
regressions with quadratic polynomials in the month-year of birth using the static bandwidth, which is the
optimal bandwidth estimated by using the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2009) algorithm, respectively. All
specifications control are birth month (as fixed effect), region26 (where they live at), partner’s/husband’s
level of education, father’s level of education, parental blood relationship, and partner’s/husband’s parental
blood relationship. Standard errors are clustered at the month-year cohort level. ***, **, and * denote
significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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